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t seems such a short time ago that I wrote in my first
column: "As we begin the new ABA year, I am privi-
leged to lead the Ad Law Section and grateful for the
opportunity." Now, as I write my last, I thank you again
for the privilege of leading the Section.
In that first column, I said my goal was to help the
Section accomplish what I see as its three core objectives:
providing opportunities for professional education and
career development; improving government administra-
tion and regulation; and providing a congenial forum to
accomplish the first two objectives.With those objectives
in mind, we have had an extremely busy year.
I won't recap here all of what the Section has done over
the past twelve months.You can pull out your back issues
of the Ad Law News for that. Instead, I wish to highlight
just some of our recent activities so you can see how they
meet our core objectives.At our Spring meeting, organ-
ized around the theme, "Administrative Law in the
Twenty-First Century," we enjoyed stimulating panel
discussions on federal, state, and interstate compact issues.
And we were fortunate to have as special guests Philip
Lader, formerAmbassador to the Court of St.James's, and
Bill Eggers, an acclaimed expert on government manage-
ment. Based on his experience at the most senior levels of
government,Ambassador Lader delivered a wide-ranging
address on current governance issues facing Europe and
the U.S. In this context, he underscored the importance
of the Section's EU Administrative Law project as a
vehicle for increasing trans-Atlantic understanding. Bill
Eggers recounted lessons contained in his latest book,
Government 2. 0: Using Technology to Improve Education, Cut
Red Tape, Reduce Gridlock, and Enhance Democracy, which is
reviewed by former section chair Ron Cass elsewhere in
this issue.
In addition to attracting a number of first-time member
attendees, a large number of spouses and significant others
attended the Spring Meeting. I hope this trend continues
for the upcoming Annual Meeting and beyond, helping
to foster a sociability that makes participation in our activ-
ities that much more enjoyable. Elsewhere you can read
about the fill range ofAnnual Meeting programs. Here I
just highlight that Richard Epstein, esteemed University
of Chicago law professor and prolific author, will be the
guest speaker at our Section dinner.
Also in this issue you will find a full report on our first
annual Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice
Institute. Although it may have been a bit bodacious to
call the Institute the "first annual" from conception, I am
now confident it will become a valuable yearly educa-
tional initiative.JackYoung, the Institute's program chair,
deserves our thanks for a job well done.
We are completing the year with three more lunch
programs, bringing to fifteen the number put on this year.
In recent months, committees that had not been active for
several years organized interesting and topical programs.
This is the type of volunteer activity upon which the
Section depends.
Indeed, in the end the success of an organization like
this rests on the contributions of a large number of volun-
teers. I am pleased the Council approved my proposal to
create a Chair's OutstandingVolunteer Award to acknowl-
edge a Section member's volunteer activities.While the
choice of the first winner won't be easy, this new award
will serve not only to recognize the accomplishments of
one deserving individual, but to signal to others that the
volunteer efforts of so many do not go unnoticed and
unappreciated.
As many of you know, the Section recently lost two
outstanding leaders, Ernest Gellhorn and Tom Sargentich.
Please take time to read about their contributions as
Section volunteers in this issue. Both exemplified the
highest standards of professionalism and personal integrity
As importantly, both warmly embodied the collegiality
that is a Section hallmark.
Of this I am certain: Like so many of us, over the years
Ernie and Tom found the Ad Law Section a special place
in which they could make significant contributions to
improving government administration and regulation,
consistent with the rule of law values at the heart of our
democratic republic.They also found a place in which a
diversity of legal and philosophical perspectives is
respected and encouraged.
Serving as editor of this magazine is another volunteer
activity that should not go unnoticed. Bill Morrow
deserves our thanks for his hard work on each issue.
Finally, I have no doubt that my successor, Eleanor
Kinney, will be a wonderfil leader of the Section, and I
wish her the best. I'm sure she will enjoy your support.
And she will have the support of Kim Knight, our Section
Director, and our excellent staff. I know we could not
have accomplished what we have this year without Kim's
talent, initiative, and dedication. C2)
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Section Chair (automatic succession per
bylaws): Eleanor D. Kinney. Eleanor is the
Samuel R. Rosen Professor of law and Co-direc-
tor of the Center for Law and Health at Indiana
University School of Law in Indianapolis. She has
been a Section Council Member as well as Chair
of the Section's Health and Human Services Committee. Her
book on Medicare coverage disputes is a strong addition to the
Section's publications program.
Section Chair-Elect (automatic succession per
bylaws): Daniel Troy. Dan is a partner in the
firm of Sidley Austin Brown &Wood. He is the
former Chief Counsel of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Dan has been a co-chair
of the Constitutional Law and Separation of
Powers Committee and a Member of the
Section's Council.
Section Vice Chair: Michael Asimow. Michael is
a professor emeritus at the University of Califor-
!I nia at Los Angeles and co-author of a leading
4, textbook on administrative law. He is a former
liaison to the Section's Council for State
Administrative Law and is completing a term as a
Council Member. He is the editor and co-author
of a new Section publication, A Guide to FederalAgency Adjudica-
tion; the drafter of a February 2005 ABA resolution on
adjudication; a past chair of the Adjudication Committee; and a
co-reporter on the EU administrative law project.
Section Delegate (renomination of incumbent for 3-year
term):Judy Kaleta. Judy Kaleta is the Senior Counsel for
Dispute Resolution for the U. S. Department ofTransportation
and the Acting Chief Counsel for the Federal Transit Adminis-
tration. She is currently completing her first term as the Section's
delegate. She is also a former member of the Council; has been
program chair for a number of Section meetings, chair for Long
Range Planning, and the Section representative to the ABA
Commission onWomen in the Profession; and played a major
role in developingABA resolutions.
Budget Officer (renomination of incumbent): Dan Cohen.
Dan is Chief Counsel for Regulation at the U.S. Department of
Commerce. In addition to serving as Assistant Budget Officer,
Dan has served as chair of the Rulemaking Committee and as
Program Chair for the Fall 2002 Meeting and other Section
programs.
Assistant Budget Officer: William Morrow. Bill is the
Executive Director and General Counsel of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Commission. He is currently the
Editor-in-Chief of the Section's Administrative and Regulatory
Law News as well as a co-chair of the Section's Interstate
Compacts Project and a former chair of the Transportation Law
Committee. He is also a Certified Public Accountant.
Secretary: James Conrad. Jamie is an Assistant General
Counsel at the American Chemistry Council. He currently
serves as co-chair of the Section's Regulatory Policy Committee
and has organized numerous educational programs for the
Section. He is also serving on the Section's ad hoc group
working to get ACUS refunded.
Council Member (each serving three-year terms):
Nina Olson. Nina is the NationalTaxpayerAdvocate and
serves as an advocate for taxpayers to the Internal Revenue
Service and Congress. She currently serves as a co-chair of the
Treasury, Revenue andTax Committee and is about to become
chair of the Ombuds Committee. Nina has also served as the
chair of two committees in the ABA Tax Section.
Michael Herz. Michael is a Professor at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law atYeshiva University. He is currently a
co-chair on the Rulemaking Committee and was vice-chair of
the Section's Blackletter Statement on U S. Administrative Law
project. He also is co-editor of a recent addition to the Section's
publication program arising out of that project, A Guide tojudi-
cial and Political Review of Federal Agencigs.
Richard G. Stoll. Dick is a partner in the Washington, D.C.,
office of Foley & Lardner. He is currently co-chair of the
Section's Rulemaking Committee and is chair of the Sponsor-
ship Committee. He has also served as chair and a member of
the Council of the ABA Section of Environment, Energy and
Resources (SEER) and has taught environmental law and policy
at the University ofVirginia.
Ann MarshallYoung. Ann is an Administrative Judge with the
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Currently she serves as a
liaison to the Section's Council for the Administrative Judiciary.
She also co-chairs the Section's Adjudication Committee and
worked closely with Michael Asimow on the recently adopted
resolution on adjudication. In addition, she is an active member
of the National Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary.
APPOINTED AT SPRING MEETING PURSUANT TO THE SECTION'S
BYLAWS AND WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COUNCIL:
Council Member (one-year term; to fill a vacancy): Richard
Parker. Richard is a professor at the University of Connecticut
School of Law. He is currently the co-chair of the Section's
Committee on Regulatory Policy. He has also organized and/or
participated in several Section programs and drafted Section
comments on proposed OMB guidelines for regulatory analysis.
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The Dangerous Allure ofJudicial Deference
in Deregulated Industries
By.Jim Rossi*
It is tempting to treat all deference in
regulatory law alike, but not all judicial
intervention deals with the direct appel-
late reviexv of agency decision making
that predominates many discussions of
administrative law Economic regulation
has its own kind of deference, reflected in
specialized doctrines of regulatory law
such as the filed rate doctrine. In a recent
article, I use the term "deference trap" to
describe the judicial reluctance to inter-
vene in economic regulation disputes
involving political institutions, such as
regulatory agencies and states.I
For most of the twentieth century,
courts rarely intervened in regulation of
natural monopoly industries.Judges
engaged in judicial review of regulatory
agency decisions, such as the setting of
utility rates by regulators following an
adjudicative hearing, but deference char-
acterized this type of reviex vWhen asked
to intervene outside of the appellate
review context, as in antitrust, contract
and tort cases, as xxell as in constitutional
challenges to state and local regulators,
courts also generally declined to inter-
vene. By-and-large agency decisions
were not upset by the judiciarx, which
routinely deferred to the expertise and
political accountability of economic
regulators.Judges were never comfort-
able meddling in these complex and
highly technical matters. xvhich courts
frequently lacked expertise and compe-
tence to resolve.
* Harry M.Walborsk; Professor and Associate
Dean for Research, Horida State University
College of Law. Email: jrossi@ax,.fsu.edu.
.1toving Public Law Out of the Deference Trap for
Regulated Industries, 39 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. (forthcoming 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfi-n?abstract id=657202.The arguments in this
article are elaborated at greater length in
REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC L AW
(Cambridge University Press 2005), xxwhich
addresses judicial intervention in emerging
competitive markets.
As industries are deregulated, public
law continues to embrace a largely
deferential attitude towards regulators.
This comes at a serious cost. By embrac-
ing deference too broadly courts can
easily eviscerate important doctrines of
public law for regulated industries,
leaving the judicial branch a mere
bystander to many disputes.This can
have particularly pernicious effects in
deregulated industries such as electric
power and telecommunications.
Deregulation challenges policy makers
and courts to reevaluate many of the
traditional public laxv doctrines that
frame the process for defining and imple-
menting the rules in competitive
markets. In this brief essay I will discuss
three vignettes which illustrate the
potential negative effects of overboard
deference in this context. First, the fied
rate doctrine illustrates a strong judicial
bias against intervention in private
disputes, giving rise to strategic forum
shopping opportunities in regulatory
enforcement. Second, if public law is not
mindful of the potential for mischief in
state and local lawmaking, courts xvill
readily fall into a deference trap xxhen
reviexving state or local regulation under
the dormant commerce clause and state
action immunity to antitrust enforce-
ment.Third, federal preemption, as
currently construed by courts, invites a
deference trap which can create regula-
tory commons problems.Together, these
vignettes illustrate how a strong norm of
deference under traditional doctrines of
regulatory lax in deregulated markets
xvill not be sufficient for competition
polic- to succeed. It is a propitious time
for courts to re-evaluate the institutional
bias against intervention in economic
regulation disputes.
SIunmer 2005
I. Deference to Private Tariff
Filings: The Filed Rate Doctrine
Under the filed rate doctrine, courts
frequently defer to regulators and refuse
to hear alleged violations of antitrust, tort
or contract claims whose resolution
would require a departure from a utility's
filed rate.When a court applies this
venerable doctrine of utility regulation-
and courts frequently do - the doctrine
serves as a litigation shield for regulated
utilities.The doctrine has a long history
and has served many important purposes
under traditional natural monopoly
regulation, where the firm availing itself
of a fied rate typically had been subject
to a rate hearing. For example, with cost-
of-service regulation the filed rate
doctrine served to protect similarly situ-
ated customers against discrimination in
the charging of rates.
As industries are deregulated, howx ever,
courts steadfastly continue to adhere to
the filed rate doctrine, even where cost-
of-service regulation no longer occurs.
For instance, firms have successfully refer-
enced filed rates to bar antitrust claims in
the deregulated electric power industry
In Town of \noiwood r Neu, England Power
Co., the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the
First Circuit allowed market-based rates
to give rise to the filed rate defense.The
court reasoned," [i]t is thefiling of the
tariffs, and not any affirmative approval or
scrutiny by the agency, that triggers the
filed rate doctrine" 202 E3d 408.419 (1st
Cir. 2000).
The deference trap of automatic applica-
tion of the filed rate doctrine to the
partially deregulated electric power indus-
n- can lead to harmful results.With
deregulated xwholesale electric power
markets at the federal level and various
degrees of deregulation across the states,
both the doctrine's continued applicability
continued on next page
Adiiinistrati'e and Regulatory Lau, Nen's
The Dangerous Allure of Judicial Deference in Deregulated Industries
continued from previous page
and usefulness are increasingly suspect.
Presumptive application of the filed rate
doctrine by both firms and courts can
cause affirmative harm for energy market
development and policy, as overboard
application of the filed rate doctrine may
allow anticompetitive and otherwise illegal
conduct to escape scrutiny altogether.
One example stands out as especially
extreme.A recent US. District Court
decision in Texas applied the filed rate
doctrine in an astonishingly broad
manner, precluding antitrust claims
against energy suppliers in the deregu-
latedTexas wholesale power market and
leaving those harmed by market abuses
without any legal or administrative
remedy. Texas Commercial Energy v. TXU
Energy, Inc., - FSupp.2d _ (S.D.Tex.,
Corpus Christi 2004). Given that it is
increasingly rare for both federal and
state regulators to conduct rate hearings,
the filed rate doctrine produces new
opportunities for firms to strategically
manipulate the regulator, taking advan-
tage of such gaps in regulation.
By contrast, in a decision that is more
mindfiil of regulatory gaps, the Ninth
Circuit recently rejected any presumption
that the filed rate doctrine applies to
market-based rates.The court suggested
that the filed rate doctrine can apply to
FERC's market-based rates, but only if
FERC does something more than make a
cursory finding of no market power in
accepting a rate filing. FERC also needs to
exercise remedial authority to more
actively monitor market-based rates for
market abuses. If FERC does not do this,
the Ninth Circuit panel suggested, "the
purpose of the filed rate doctrine is
undermined" and "the tariff runs afoul of
... the FPA." Lockyer v. FERC, 383 E3d
1006,1016 (9h Cir. 2004). In such a case,
an enforcement gap -as in Texas - would
exist and the filed rate doctrine could have
dangerous effects on the enforcement of
rules in emerging competitive markets.
Courts should generally refuse to apply
the filed rate doctrine absent a rate
Administrative and Regulatory Law News
hearing, instead looking to other more
accepted defenses (such as federal
preemption and primary jurisdiction)
where judicial intervention is not appro-
priate.As a defense in cases involving
energy markets, the filed rate doctrine
continues to serve an important purpose
where three conditions are present: where
nondiscrimination remains an important
regulatory goal; where regulators possess
the authority and in fact do evaluate costs
and prices; and where regulators possess
an adequate remedy for nondiscrimina-
tion. Cost-of-service regulation may have
justified a presumption against the exer-
cise ofjudicial authority in most cases, but
absent evidence to the contrary in dereg-
ulated markets it must be presumed that
the agency has not engaged in an exten-
sive firm-specific evaluation of
nondiscrimination.
II. Deference to State
Regulators: The Dormant
Commerce Clause and State
Action Immunity
The deference trap in regulated indus-
tries may also have implications for the
formulation of state regulation. If courts
are too deferential to state and local regu-
lators, deregulated markets may result in
more - not less - use of the political
process to engage in socially harrnfil rent
seeking. Doctrinally, concerns over such
mischief in state and local lawmaking
play out in the contexts of the dormant
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion and state action immunity from
antitrust enforcement.
The "dormant" commerce clause,
derived from the Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, limits the power of
a state to enact barriers to interstate
commerce that are blatantly discrimina-
tory against out-of-state businesses, or
which have the effect of bringing about
such discrimination.As more robust
interstate markets develop in electric
power, deference to state and local regula-
4
tors under the dormant commerce clause
can have obviously harmful effects.
For example, the dormant commerce
clause may preclude a state from refusing
to site a power transmission line for
purposes of protecting its incumbent
utilities. Indeed, such a challenge was
brought when Connecticut's Attorney
General was successful in delaying the
operation of a new transmission line
across the Long Island Sound, from New
Haven, Connecticut to Long Island,
NewYork.The doctrine also may
prohibit a state or local government from
siting a power plant to insulate incum-
bent firms from competition. Such a case
was presented in Florida, when a new
competitor was denied the opportunity
to apply for a siting license because the
project was not sponsored by an in-state
utility or serving primarily Florida retail
customers. Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia, 767
So.2d 428 (Fla. 2000).
State action immunity suspends federal
antitrust enforcement under the Sherman
and Clayton Acts - statutes designed to
enhance competition and free trade
norms - where a state actively supervises
the private activity.While the dormant
commerce clause is pro-competitive (and
hence anti-protectionist) in spirit, state
action immunity from antitrust enforce-
ment is seemingly pro-regulation,
presenting an interesting apparent
contrast in goal and approach.
Given state action immunity, and regu-
latory rate hearings at the state level,
price-regulated public utilities (including
electric and telecommunications monop-
olies) have long escaped the scrutiny of
antitrust enforcement for their regulated
activities. Rate proceedings served to
police concerns with the exercise of
market power.With deregulation,
however, there is widespread recognition
that antitrust laws may play an increasingly
important role in deregulated industries,
such as telecommunications, electric
power, and natural gas.To the extent state
regulation is not comprehensive in a
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deregulated industry, immunity from
antitrust enforcement must be approached
with extreme caution.
State action immunity - once widely
taken for granted by firms in the electric
power and telecommunications industries
- should also no longer automatically bar
antitrust suits in utility industries. Unfor-
tunately, courts have not taken a
principled approach to deciding when to
suspend state action immunity in utility
industries.The Ninth Circuit has carefiUly
assessed the degree of state oversight
necessary for state action immunity, but
decisions from other circuits are inconsis-
tent with a careful evaluation of state
oversight; the Eighth,Tenth and Eleventh
Circuit have granted state action immu-
nity even where state regulators had little
or no scrutiny over private activity in
deregulated electric power markets.
2
A principled approach to state action
immunity in the context of economic
regulation would not accept state regula-
tion at face value as providing for
immunity from antitrust enforcement. For
example, if a state legislature deregulates
retail electric power markets but provides
for no market rule enforcement mecha-
nism, antitrust law should apply even
where the state legislature purports to
exempt firms in that state from antitrust
challenges. Strong judicial deference in the
state action immunity context would
actually encourage more mischief in
lawmaking, as private firms would be
encouraged to lobby for state and local
exemption from antitrust enforcement.
At a minimum, state action immunity
requires a meaningful evaluation of
whether state or local regulators actively
supervise private activity in ways that are
co-extensive with the pro-competitive
goals of the antitrust laws.As with the filed
rate doctrine, meaningful supervision by a
regulator is necessary. State rate hearings
should generally qualify for immunity, but
absent at least this degree of supervision
2 As is discussed inJim Rossi, Political Bargain-
ing and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional and
Antitrust Federalism, 83 WASH. U.L.Q. (forth-
coming 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com./sol3/papers.cfinabstract id=669801.
3 Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision
Without Site; Site Without Vision, ELECTRICITY
JOURNAL, October 2003, at 23.
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no antitrust state action immunity should
be extended in deregulated markets.
Ill. Deference to Federal
Regulators: Federal Preemption
One final area in which judicial defer-
ence may have pernicious effects for
economic regulation involves judicial
deference to the authority of federal
regulators, frequently at the expense of
state and local solutions to regulatory
problems. Under the Chevron doctrine,
which federal courts frequently invoke to
defer to reasonable agency interpretations
of law, Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837,865 (1984), a federal agency's
construction of its jurisdictional statutes is
generally upheld.This type of deference
can lead to sweeping federal preemption
of some or all aspects of state and local
regulation of competition policy.
If federal agency jurisdiction over prob-
lems were exhaustive, the judicial
willingness to preempt state and local regu-
lation would not present any barrier to
competition policy at all. However, in some
contexts the authority of federal regulators
is limited by Congress. For example, under
the Federal PowerAct, FERC regulates
wholesale sales of electric power, but has no
jurisdiction over retail sales or over the
decision to site transmission lines and
power plants - even those that may be built
to sell power in deregulated wholesale
power supply markets. Since often federal
and state regulators share turf,jurisdictional
commons may create problems of regula-
tory inaction. For example, in the context
of California's failed deregulation plan,
federal regulators blamed California's retail
price cap as a source of the failure of its
competitive policies, while California regu-
lators blamed FERC for skyrocketing
power procurement costs due to FERC's
failure to impose a price cap on wholesale
power sales.
In addition to deferring to federal
regulators where congressional grants of
authority are ambiguous, courts routinely
defer to state regulatory processes in the
context of economic regulation.The
result of broad deference in interpreting
ambiguous federal statutes and regulations
is to presumptively favor imperfect federal
5
solutions while largely ignoring the deci-
sion making process of states.
A different public law approach would be
not to embrace automatic deference to both
federal and state systems in this context.
Where Congress has failed to enact clear
statutes- and Congress certainly is not the
institution on which the success of deregu-
lated markets should hinge - federal courts
have the power to nudge states towards
action by empowering state regulators to
take into account federal goals as they make
their decisions, even absent explicit state
legislative authorization.
For example, one emerging barrier to
the development of interstate markets in
electric power is state veto over the siting
of transmission lines and siting of genera-
tion facilities which would supply power
in deregulated markets.As others have
chronicled, in many states stagnant siting
statutes do not authorize state or local
regulators to consider national or
regional concerns, effectively inviting
regulators to avoid opening up their
network access facilities to out-of-state
competitors.3 One recognized barrier to
interstate power markets is state legisla-
tures, which may lack any institutional
incentive to modify old regulatory
statutes adopted wx ith a different regula-
tory model in mind.
To the extent the problem is stale state
lasv federal courts can draw on preemp-
tion principles to overcome the impasse.
Rather than deferring to state and local
siting laws, federal courts could authorize
state or local siting boards to take into
account federal goals in interstate trans-
mission markets.The very same
preemption principles that courts
embrace in evaluating a federal agency 's
jurisdiction could be put to use in a
different way - deferring to clearly artic-
ulated national or regional goals, but in a
way that authorizes state or local execu-
tive actors to make important regulator-
decisions, even -where delegated author-
itn- under state law is stale.
CONCLUSION
Together, these three examples illustrate
the danger of blanket judicial deference to
political institutions and states as new
continued on page 11
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marked 33 years on the Supreme
Court.Just about everyone expects
that O.T. 2004 will be ChiefJustice
Rehnquist's last.As the assessments of
his work and that of the Rehnquist
Court begin, it seems safe to assume
that not many will focus on administra-
tive law. Administrative law has hardly
been a preoccupation of the Chief
Justice, nor is it an area in which the
Rehnquist Court has made striking or
distinctive contributions.Yet an exami-
nation ofJustice Rehnquist's own
administrative law opinions, as well as a
review of the Rehnquist Court's
administrative law jurisprudence, can
tell us something useful about both the
individual and the institution.
Alternative Working Hypotheses
Consider two possible starting points
for considering the administrative law
decisions of the Court.The academic
literature on the Rehnquist Court, and
much of the coverage in the press,
portrays the Court as overconfident, arro-
gant, undeferential, and too fond of its
own power.The sense one gets is that the
Court, like some suspiciously successfiil
athletes, has bulked up on steroids,
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of LawYeshiva University. This is a much-short-
ened version of The Relnquist Court and
Administrative Laiv, 99 Nw. L. Rev. 297 (2004).
448 U.S. 607,671 (1980) (Rehnquist,J., concur-
ring) (setting aside workplace safety standard for
benzene).
2 463 U.S. 29,57 (1983) (Rehnquist,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
3 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that FDA's decision
not to assert jurisdiction over drugs used by states
to administer lethal injections for executions was
not subject to judicial review).
4435 U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that agency regula-
tion was not procedurally invalid, despite agency's
failure to allow an evidentiary hearing -with cross-
exanination, since neither the Constiution nor
any statute required such a procedure).
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becoming more powerful and muscular
than is natural.The Court holds laws
unconstitutional at a breathtaking rate,
refuses to defer to other governmental
actors, and trumpets its authority to "say
what the law is."This methodological
hubris is combined with an obsession
with federalism and a tendency toward
politically conservative positions: pro-
business, anti-criminal defendant, and
anti-civil rights.
What sort of administrative law deci-
sions should we expect from such a
Court? It would insist on deciding legal
questions for itself and define that cate-
gory expansively. It would second-guess
agencies on non-legal issues as well, scru-
tinize agency fact-finding, be dubious of
claims of agency expertise, narrowly
construe statutory or constitutional limits
on its own authority to review agency
action, and hear a lot of cases. Such a
Court would be hostile to agency regu-
lations that preempt state law. And its raw
political commitments suggest a prefer-
ence for the market over government
regulation that would make it quick to
set aside agency regulations.
Alternatively, one might predict the
Rehnquist Court's administrative law
jurisprudence by examining the admin-
istrative law opinions ofWilliam
Rehnquist himself.This can be quickly
done, for there are so few such opinions.
Justice Rehnquist wrote only the rare
opinion in an administrative law case.
Once ChiefJustice Rehnquist began
assigning opinions, that trickle slowed to
a drip. Four important and paradigmatic
opinions do stand out, however. First, in
Industrial Union Department,AFL-CIO v
American Petroleum Institute,' "the Benzene
case,"Justice Rlehnquist, writing only for
himself, argued that the Occupational
Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority to the executive branch
because Congress had failed to set out an
6
intelligible principle to guide or limit
agency discretion. Second, dissenting in
part in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-
tion v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company,2 the airbags case,
Rehnquist argued against "hard look"
review and asserted that the Court
should respect the challenged deregula-
tory action as the product of a popular
mandate expressed in a presidential elec-
tion.Third, in Heckler v. Chaney,
3
Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the
Court holding that agency inaction, at
least with regard to enforcement, is
presumptively unreviewable.And fourth,
Justice Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous
Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC,4 which brought an end
to the lower courts' development of a
common law of administrative procedure
that went beyond the requirements of
particular statutes or the Constitution.
Each of these opinions reflects a
hands-off conception ofjudicial review
of agency action, displays a skepticism
that there are "right" answers to ques-
tions of value or politics, and looks to
electorally accountable officials to resolve
such questions. Significantly, each arises
in a setting in which law gives out;
Rehnquist's consistent message is that if
there is "no law to apply" then there is
nothing for a reviewing court to do.
So we have two possible starting points
from which to analyze the Rehnquist
Court's administrative law jurisprudence.
William Rehnquist's own prominent
administrative law opinions lead us to
expect the Court largely to leave agen-
cies alone; call it the "hands-off"
approach. Much recent literature on the
contemporary Supreme Court leads us
to expect a much more aggressive,
second-guessing, and possibly result-
oriented jurisprudence; call it the
"judicial hegemony approach."The
Court's actual decisions have been much
closer to the first model.
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Scope of Review
When Rehnquist became Chief
Justice, the Court had just decided the
hegemonic State Farm and the hands-off
Chevron.At the time, State Farm seemed a
defining moment; Chevron was ignored.
But in the ensuing two decades, it is State
Farm that has been invisible. By my
count, the Supreme Court has cited State
Farm only 25 times since Rehnquist
became Chief'Justice, and then almost
always in a dissent, or only to be distin-
guished, for a pabulum proposition, or in
a mild and revisionist manner. Its unxvill-
ingness to undertake hard look review
can be seen, for example, in erizon
Communications v. FCC,5 in xvhich the
Court, overJustice Breyer's lone, Leven-
thalian dissent, essentially
rubber-stamped an agency decision. Or
Department ofTransportation v. Public
Citizen,6 in which the lower court had
demonstrated just how hard a "hard
look" can be, but the Supreme Court
engaged in no such fact-intensive
scrutiny, holding instead that the decision
was not, and could not have been, arbi-
trary and capricious as a matter of lai.
In contrast, Chevron has proved the
kudzu of administrative law.And its basic
posture is one of deference rather than
assertiveness.The hegemonic Court
535 U.S. 467 (2002).
6 124 .Ct. 2204 (2004).
' See, e.g., FDA v. Brown &Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
1 See, e.g., Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529
U.S. 728 (2000).
9 See, e.g., INS v.Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 US. 415
(1999) (upholding the agency, and invoking
Chevron, but deciding entirely on the basis of its
independent reading of the statute).
" See, e.g., Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of
the Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003); United States
v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002); Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
u See McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003);
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, (1997); Dalton v.
Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994);Air Courier
Conference of America v. American Postal
Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991);Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
12Whitman v.Am.TruckingAss'ns, 531 U.S.
457 (2001).
13 FDA v. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
14 Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer,.Judicial
Deference toAgencyAcion: A Rational Choice
Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. Rv.
431,460-61,474-75 (1996).
might have insisted that thejudiciary's
"duty to say what the law is" extends
equally to statutes and the Constitution.
But Chevron shows the Court to be much
less protective of its turf with regard to
the former. Furthermore, in requiring
judicial acceptance of agency interpreta-
tions, the Court is, it says, following a
congressional directive. So the Court is not
only deferring to agencies, but doing so
because Congress said to: two doses of
modesty for the price of one.
Now, this portrait requires some quali-
fications. For one thing, it is hard to take
the congressional delegation theory of
deference at face value. More important,
the Court is not actually as deferential to
agencies as all the fuss about Chevron
would make it seem. Often the Court
cites Chevron but stays within step one
and does not defer;' sometimes it does
not cite Chevron at all, even when
upholding the agency;8 and sometimes it
cites Chevron and gives lip service to
deference, but interprets the statute
completely on its own.9 In short, there is
a gap between the Court's doctrine, or its
ideology, and its practice.This is only a
gap, however, not a chasm.
Justiciability
Limits onjusticiability are direct limits
on judicial power.Accordingly, a hege-
monic court would have a narrow
understanding ofjusticiability bars. In
contrast, a hands-off court ought, in prin-
ciple, to limit access to the courts in the
first place. In general, the Rehnquist
Court has not expanded, and to some
extent has narrowed, the availability of
the judicial review 0The few administra-
tive law opinions that ChiefJustice
Rehnquist has assigned to himself have all
been in cases holding agency action unre-
\iewable. 11
As with regard to Chevron, the surface
appearance ofjudicial moderation is
somewhat misleading. In particular, the
Court's hands-off approach can be selec-
tive, more often closing the door to those
seeking more stringent regulation than
those seeking laxer regulation.The most
prominent instance of this asymmetr -




The Rehnquist Court generally, and
its five more conservative members in
particular, are often perceived as pro-
market, pro-business, and antiregulation.
Strikingly, those views are invisible
where one would most expect to see
them-viz., in direct reviewv of agency
regulations.
The Rehnquist Court has operated
during a period of profound debate
about regulatory policy, but one would
not know it by reading the Court's opin-
ions. For example, the phrase "cost
benefit analysis" does not appear in the
U.S. Reports except in occasional infor-
mal use in nonregulatory settings such as
procedural due process.The Court's
federalism opinions are virtually silent
about the supposed regulatory advan-
tages of decentralization. Indeed, an
important premise of the Court's federal-
ism religion is that decentralization and
multiple jurisdictions are valuable
precisely because questions of policy do
not have single right answers.The
Court's agnosticism about regulatory
policy was on strong display in American
Tracking.1 Though much anticipated, the
decision proved an inconsequential
nonevent, wx hich is exactly the point.The
decision's very modesty underscores the
hands-off model of the Court and
undercuts the judicial hegemony model.
The strongest counter example is
Broun &ITI Yllianson.1 which set aside the
FDA's effort to regulate tobacco ciga-
rettes and is seen by many as an example
of pro-industry, anti-regulation judicial
activism. It is certainly suspicious that in
this case all the Justices abandoned their
usual methodological commitments.The
convenient methodological shifts do
suggest that the result wvas driven by the
indixidualJustices' svinpath, or lack
thereof, toward the FDA's undertaking.
The trickier question is whether an
anti-regulatory agenda is reflected in
the indirect consequences of doctrines
that are neutral on their face. For
example, some see Chevron as a tool for
furthering the Court's anti-regulation
policy goals.1 4 It would be such if the
White House were always in Republi-
continued on next page
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can hands. Since it is not, then we
should look for "no-deference"
messages during the Clinton years, and
then a rediscovery of deference during
the Bush presidency.Yet there does not
seem to be such an ebb and flow. On
the doctrinal level, if anything, the
pattern has been the opposite:The
most significant doctrinal pruning of
Chevron occurred in Mead,i" which
involved a Bush administration agency.
And the one serious effort to tabulate
the Court's decisions found no decline
in deference signals during the Clinton
administration. 16
The strongest argument that an anti-
regulatory policy preference is
reflected in a facially neutral doctrine
can be made with regard to standing.
All the justices tend to be more recep-
tive to standing for interests they favor
politically than those they oppose; the
conservative justices slightly outnum-
ber the liberal ones; and the liberal
ones are generally more inclined to
find that standing exists. As a result
plaintiffs challenging government
regulation as excessive are more likely
to have access to the courthouse than
are plaintiffs challenging the govern-
ment regulation as inadequate.The
1s United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001).
16 Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Recon-
sidering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference to
AdninistrativeAgencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 657,
688-96 (2004).
17 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
18 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
"A useful description is Cynthia Farina, Stand-
ing, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL
REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 17, 44-48 (John
E Duffy & Michael Herz eds. 2005).
"' Ltian, 504 U.S. at 561-62.
21 See, e.g., Engine Mfrs.Ass'n v. S. Coast Air
Quality Mgt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756 (2004); Geier
v.Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000);
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,
517 U.S.25 (1996).
22This is the explicit message ofJustice Breyer's
concurrence in Bates v. DowAgrosciences, 125 S.
Ct. 1788 (2005).
23 SeeWhitman v.Am.TruckingAss'ns, 531 U.S.
457, 472-74 (2001); Loving v. United States, 517
U.S. 748 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361 (1988).
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Court has also been hostile to private
enforcement of regulatory statutes,
even when Congress has created an
explicit cause of action or citizen suit
provision.The most prominent such
case is Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlfe.
17
And yet ... in the case that could have
meant the death knell for citizen suits,
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envi-
ronmental Services, Inc.,18 the Court
stepped back from the brink. Had
Laidlatv come out the other way, the
result would have been dramatic and its
impact enormous.As it is, the Court's
restrictions have been meaningful and
important, but still at the margin.
The subtlest anti-regulatory aspect of
the Court's standing decisions
concerns the hurdles faced by regula-
tory beneficiaries. i9 Lujan explicitly
articulates a double standard for regu-
lated entities and regulatory
beneficiaries. 2 Lujan has not trans-
formed standing doctrine, but it does
mean the role of the courts in policing
administrative implementation will be
one-sided, serving to correct overregu-
lation more than underregulation.
As usual, then, the Court's bark is
worse than its bite. It has not followed
through on the most ferocious implica-
tions of its opinions.The standing
restrictions advance an antiregulatory
agenda only indirectly, operating at the
meta-level, in the arena of procedure
rather than substance.
A final example of an arguable anti-
regulatory doctrine can be found in the
Rehnquist Court's preemption deci-
sions. Unexpectedly, the Court has been
rather quick to find state regulation
preempted by federal statutes.2 1 There is
some tension between these decisions
and the preoccupation with federalism
at the constitutional level.
Almost by definition, the plaintiffi in
these cases are business interests that are
unhappy with state regulations that are
stricter than their federal counterparts.
Therefore, one might explain these deci-
sions as reflecting the Court's pro-business,
anti-regulatory leanings, which trump its
more abstract states' rights leanings.This
8
explanation cannot be disproved.
However, it seems an oversimplification.
Some additional light is cast by
thinking of these as administrative law
cases. Preemption claims often involve
a set of highly detailed federal regula-
tions. In these instances, if the Court
finds preemption, it is not merely
rejecting state laws or protecting busi-
ness from regulations or liability. It is
also preserving the authority of a
federal agency. In this respect, these
decisions are one more instance of the




From time to time, it seems that the
Court may actually give teeth to the
nondelegation doctrine, as Justice Rehn-
quist's opinions in Benzene and Cotton
Dust urged.Yet it never happens .2 The
Rehnquist Court keeps rejecting the
invitation to do what it is we are so often
told that it likes to do: throw its weight
around, refuse to defer to Congress's
judgment, strike down federal statutes
with abandon, and return to a pre-New
Deal Eden. Like its predecessors, the
Rehnquist Court accepts broad delega-
tions of legislative authority. If it differs
from its predecessors, it is in a moderately
careful insistence that the delegation is to
the agency, not to the judiciary. In this,
again, it is less aggrandizing, not more.
At least two factors seem to be at
work here.The first is simply an assess-
ment of the merits; the Justices have
concluded that a nondelegation
doctrine with teeth would be unman-
ageable and unenforceable in a
consistent way. Also important, though,
is that the nondelegation doctrine
enhances the authority of agencies at
the expense of Congress.The Court
seems not unhappy with such a shift.
It is often said that the nondelega-
tion doctrine has evolved into an
interpretative canon under which the
judiciary will read into the statute
details Congress did not put there so as
continued on page 12
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Pesticide Litigation and State Law
After Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
By Alexandra B. Klass*
very year, nearly 5 billion tons of
pesticides are intentionally
applied to the American land-
scape. Pesticides have eradicated deadly
diseases worldwide and allowed the
United States to become an agricultural
giant, but have also created a significant
risk to human health and the environ-
ment. The high stakes at issue have
caused the federal government to create
a comprehensive system of pesticide
regulation, which has been subject to a
significant amount of litigation.
The bulk of this litigation has tended to fall
into two distinct categories. The first cate-
gory consists of claims by pesticide users
against pesticide manufacturers for personal
injury or damaged crops where the key issue
often involves whether such claims are
preempted by the federal pesticide law- the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cideAct ("FIFRA"). The second category of
cases generally involves state common law
claims by non-pesticide users against pesti-
cide users (usually neighboring landowners
or aerial pesticide applicators), for property
damage, crop damage and/or personal injury
and relies little on FIFRA preemption prin-
ciples. This article discusses developments in
pesticide law that can promote federal
uniformity regarding pesticide labeling while
utilizing recent Supreme Court develop-
ments to enhance the claims available to
obtain relieffor pesticide damages.
Pesticide Use and Pesticide Law
A "pesticide" is defined by federal law as
any substance intended for "preventing,
destroying, repelling or mitigating any
pest" and any substance intended for use
as a "plant regulator, defoliant, or desic-
* Associate Professor of LawWilliam Mitchell
College of Law. A more extensive version of
this Article will be published in 32 ECOLOGY
LAW QUARTERLY No. 4 (Winter 2005). This
Article is reprinted by permission of the
Regents of the University of California.
cant." As of 2004, there were over 1,000
active chemical ingredients being formu-
lated for nearly 20,000 registered
commercial pesticides. While many in the
agricultural sector give much of the credit
for the enormous increase in agricultural
productivity in the 201h century to pesti-
cide use, others point to the serious
adverse impacts of pesticides on human
health and the environment. The struggle
to balance the risks and benefits of pesti-
cide use has been at the core of FIFRA
since its enactment, and continues today.
FIFRA's primary provisions create and
administer a federal, uniform system of
registering pesticides. A pesticide cannot
be manufactured, distributed or
imported until it is registered and
approved by EPA. The EPA administra-
tor approves the registration if, among
other things, it will perform its intended
function when used appropriately
N-ithout "unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment." FIFRA defines
"unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment" as "... any unreasonable
risk to man or the environment, taking
into account the economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits of the
use of any pesticide...." Precisely
because the purpose of pesticides is to
kill living things that are part of the envi-
ronment, EPA's major policy function is
to balance the "collateral damage" against
the benefits of pesticide use.
FIFRA defines the term "label" as the
written, printed, or graphic material
attached to the pesticide or any of its
containers or wxrappers. EPA reviewxv and
approval of the "label" to accompany the
pesticide is a major component of the
pesticide registration process. Because
the label sets the conditions under which
the pesticide can be used xv-ithout
causing unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment, any departure from
label requirements constitutes pesticide
misuse and is subject to enforcement.
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FIFRA provides that a state may regu-
late the sale or use of any federally-
registered pesticide but may not permit
any sale or use prohibited by FIFRA.
States may ban completely certain pesti-
cides or place additional restrictions on
use. The primary area in which FIFRA
prohibits state involvement is labeling. In
a section entitled"Uniformity," FIFRA
provides that a state "shall not impose or
continue in effect any requirements for
labeling or packaging in addition to or
different from those required under this
subchapter." The question of which state
actions (whether actions by state agencies,
jury verdicts or judicial decisions) are (or
should be) subject to preemption under
this provision as a result of the Supremacy




An obvious consequence of FIFRA's
balancing ofbenefits and "unreasonable"
adverse effects on the environment is
scores of individuals, companies and
natural areas that are adversely impacted by
legally registered pesticides. These injuries
take the form of lost crops, loss of organic
certification, loss of species, degradation of
air, soil and wx ater, significant personal
injury and death. A large number of these
cases are brought by pesticide users against
pesticide manufacturers and claim that
additional warnings on the label or other
actions that should have been taken by the
manufacturer would have prevented the
harm. These cases are generally heard in
federal court (as a result ofdiversitvjuris-
diction) but nearly always rely on state tort
theories because, unlike some other federal
environmental statutes, FIFRA does not
include a private right of action for
damages or injunctive relief These cases all
continued on next page
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involve whether state claims for pesticide
damages are preempted by FIFRA's prohi-
bition that a state shall not impose any
requirements for labeling "in addition to or
different from" FIFRA.
Since the early 1990s, as a result of a
Supreme Court decision involving a
federal labeling statute similar to FIFRA,
federal courts of appeal nationwide have
applied FIFRA preemption broadly to
hold that most state tort law claims against
pesticide manufacturers were preempted
by FIFRA.The rationale behind these
decisions was that common law claims for
damages might cause manufacturers to
change their product labels to avoid future
lawsuits, thus creating a requirement "in
addition" to federal labeling standards.
Some, but not all, appellate courts applied
FIFRA preemption so broadly as to hold
that even state laws that allowed damages
for violations of FIFRA's own provisions
were subject to preemption.
This extremely broad view of FIFRA
preemption came to an end onApril 27,
2005, when the U.S. Supreme Court
released its decision in Bates v. DowAgro-
sciences. Bates involved claims byTexas
peanut farmers for crop damage caused
by the herbicide "Strongarm." The
plaintiffs claimed that Dow knew or
should have known that the herbicide
would stunt the growth of peanuts in soil
with a particular pH level and asserted
numerous state law claims including
strict liability, negligence, fraud and
breach of express warranty. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted
the scope of FIFRA preemption very
broadly to hold that FIFRA preempted
all of the state law claims because a judg-
ment against Dow might induce it to
alter its EPA-approved product label and
thus would impose a requirement differ-
ent from or in addition to that under
FIFRA in violation of federal law.
The Supreme Court reversed. In an
opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court
stated that appellate courts across the
country had been reading FIFRA's prohi-
bition on state labeling requirements too
broadly. The Court confirmed that
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FIFRA may preempt common law claims
for damages as well as affirmative state laws
and regulations, but that it was necessary to
determine the scope of that preemption.
The Court stressed that FIFRA
preempted only requirements relating to
"labeling or packaging" that were "in addi-
tion to or different from" those required
under FIFRA. Thus, common law rules
that are consistent with federal require-
ments (i.e., allow for damages for violations
of standards consistent with federal
requirements) are not preempted. The
Court noted that private, state remedies
that enforce federal misbranding require-
ments would aid, rather than hinder,
FIFRA and should be encouraged.
Using FIFRA to Promote
Uniformity and Encourage
Creation of New Causes of Action
for Pesticide Damages
Standing in contrast to cases brought
by pesticide users against pesticide manu-
facturers are claims by non-pesticide
users against pesticide users. Plaintifl in
these cases seek damages for lost crops,
loss of organic certification, loss to bees
and other animals and personal injury
under various state common law claims.
These cases often present classic cases of
disputes over competing land uses (e.g.,
residential versus agricultural). In
contrast to the claims against manufac-
turers discussed above, the claims by
non-pesticide users against pesticide
users are heard almost exclusively in state
court and rarely discuss FIFRA, preemp-
tion or label compliance. Moreover,
these cases tend to rely heavily on negli-
gence theory. The reliance on
negligence without reference to unifying
principles of FIFRA and the EPA-
approved label often results in a lack of
consistency of analysis within and among
jurisdictions and significant uncertainty
for litigants. This article proposes that
there are FIFRA uniformity principles
that can be used to help provide more
coherency in these cases without dinin-
10
ishing the ability of plaintiffs to obtain
relief for pesticide damages.
Although cases involving conflicting
land uses relating to pesticides are typically
areas reserved for state courts drawing on
their own state's jurisprudence, it is a
mistake to ignore FIFRA and EPA's dele-
gated role in setting the standard of care
for pesticide registration and use. Relying
on an amorphous common law negli-
gence standard apart from the pesticide
label provides little guidance to pesticide
sprayers and landowners attempting to use
legal pesticides on their own property and
also gives insufficient information to liti-
gants regarding what types of expert
testimony or other evidence will be
necessary to establish liability.
By contrast, using the label to establish
the standard of care for negligence claims
provides predictability for both sides and is
consistent with EPA's delegated role under
FIFRA. If a plaintiff is harmed by the
pesticide use of another party, the plaintiff
can go to the label and build his or her
negligence case around the requirements of
the label- to the extent the weather condi-
tions were inappropriate for spraying or
directions relating to how, when, and
where the pesticide should be sprayed were
ignored, the defendant would be liable
under a theory ofnegligence per se. To the
extent the defendant followed all relevant
label directions, it would be entitled to a
presumption that its conduct was reason-
able. This presumption could be rebutted
by a showing that the label did not
expressly regulate the conduct in question.
This analysis would have no impact on a
court's analysis of claims for intentional
torts or strict liability which do not turn on
reasonable conduct. In this way, the parties
and the court can look to the label to help
set the standard of care, providing unifor-
rmity and predictability among users and
victims of the same pesticide nationwide
and filfilling FIFRA's goals.
More important, stepping away from
litigants' historic reliance on negligence
allows one to posit that traditional claims
of intentional trespass and private nuisance
are better suited than negligence to
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balance benefits and harms of pesticide
use on a local level.Trespass, of course, is
any intentional invasion of another's prop-
erty without authorization or privilege by
law. Generally, the plaintiff need not prove
that the defendant intended to commit a
trespass, but only that the defendant
intended to commit the act (i.e., the
spraying of the pesticide) and the act was
done with knowledge to a substantial
certainty that it would result in the intro-
duction of the substance onto the
plaintiff's property. Thus, there is no
reason that evidence of pesticide residues
on neighboring land cannot constitute an
intentional trespass where it is shown that,
based on wind or other conditions, the
pesticide was substantially certain to
invade the plaintiff's property. In such a
case, the pesticide user's compliance with
the label is irrelevant - no breach of a duty
of care is required for liability.
Likewise, in the many cases in which a
plaintiff alleges pesticide-related damages in
the absence of a trespass, private nuisance is
a better vehicle than negligence to balance
individual circumstances without detract-
ing from the nationally uniform label
standards mandated by FIFRA. Signifi-
candy, intentional nuisance is actionable
even in the face of reasonable care (here,
compliance with the label), if, because of
nearby residential areas, endangered species,
protected waters or other local factors the
court may consider, the use of the pesticide
is simply not appropriate.
Another complementary means to
pursue claims for pesticide damage in the
competing land use cases is to utilize other
federal environmental laws such as the
Clean Water Act and CERCLA (and
equivalent state laws) to recover damages
and obtain injunctive relief for pesticide-
related damages. Even better, since Bates,
FIFRA is no longer a bar in any jurisdic-
tion to states creating a private right of
action for damages for use of pesticides
contrary to federal law. These types of
statutes, taken together with common law
trespass and nuisance claims, can provide
plaintifi in both sets of cases with power-
fill tools to combat pesticide misuse, while
retaining a more unified, federal structure
governing use ofpesticides. C>
The Dangerous Allure of Judicial Deference in Deregulated Industries continued from page 5
markets emerge due to restructuring.
Courts need to be mindful of the implica-
tions of such a stance for private behavior
in the regulatory process. Deference
produces opportunities for private manip-
ulation of the regulator in w\vays that did
not exist when rate hearings were the
norm. Deference also may encourage
recalcitrance in state legislatures where a
state's political momentum favors holding
out from interstate markets.
In Memoriam
Our colleague and friend
Thomas 0. Sargentich, Professor
of Law at American University's
Washington College of Law,
passed away on April 21,2005.
Professor Sargentich was a
long-time active member of the
Section, serving with distinction
as a Member of the Council and
as Chair andVice Chair of
several Section Committees, and
a strong supporter of Section
activities.
Of course, there is an undeniable danger
to takingjudicial intervention too far. But
judicial evaluation of regulatory disputes in
emerging markets need not embrace judicial
scrutiny of substantive economic arrange-
ments as occurred during the Lxhner era.
Courts can play a positive role without
treading on substantive political decisions by
focusing on the process concerns that plague
the development ofcompetition and
enforcement policies in deregulated markets.
Professor Sargentich was
instrumental in locating the
Administrative Law Review at
American University's Washing-
ton College of Law and served
as the Chairman of the Faculty
Board for the Law Review.
Professor Sargentich was a
nationally recognized scholar in
Administrative Law and Consti-
tutional Separation of Powers,
with a strong commitment to
understanding and improving
government under law, who
participated on numerous
Section panels and programs.
If courts are attentive to the bargaining
process by which regulation evolves, even
when markets are emerging, public law
stands to improve the functioning of
competitive markets, such as those evolv-
ing in telecommunications and electric
power. However, with a recognition of
some judicial role, courts will no longer be
able to hide behind deference to escape
blame -,,hen deregulatory policies fail. C3
Professor Sargentich
discharged his professional
duties and his work for the
Section with honesty, integrity,
kindness, good humor, and, in
the end, consummate courage
and grace.
The Section expresses its
sadness at Tom's passing and
honors his memory for his
contributions to this Section,
the legal profession, legal educa-
tion, and legal scholarship and
for the friendship he shared
with all of us.
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In Memoriam
Our friend and colleague Ernest
Gelihorn, University Foundation
Professor of Law at George Mason
University School of Law and
distinguished practitioner of law
passed away suddenly on May 7,
2005.
Professor Gellhorn, as author,
scholar, and long-time member of
the Administrative Conference of
the United States, and leader of this
ABA Section of Administrative Law
and Regulatory Practice, was for
decades a leading figure in American
administrative law and a mentor to
many leaders of the Section--one
who challenged received wisdom,
made his colleagues better lawyers
and thinkers, probed issues relent-
lessly to find the bottom and
followed where the analysis led,
worked tirelessly to support gender
and racial diversity, and was unfail-
ingly gracious to professional
colleagues and ready to give others
credit for work jointly performed.
As a nationally recognized scholar
in administrative law and antitrust,
Professor Gellhorn also taught with
distinction on the faculties of the
Duke andVirginia law schools and
served as Dean of the Arizona State
University, University of-Washing-
ton and Case Western University
law schools.
Professor Gellhorn also practiced
law as a partner in the law firm of
Jones Day, counseling wisely and
arguing cases in the highest courts,
including the United States
Supreme Court.
As a long-time leader of our
Section, Professor Gellhorn served
in such crucial roles as a: member of
the Council, Chair of the Section,
Section delegate to the House of
Delegates, and Chair of the Fellows
of the Section, and through his
energy, good humor and insight
helped build this Section to its
current place of eminence in the
field of administrative law, and effec-
tively represented its interests within
the larger Bar Association.
The Section expresses our deep
sadness at Ernest's passing to his wife
Jackie, his daughter Ann, and his son
Thomas, and honors his memory
for his extraordinary contributions
to this Section, the law school world
and the legal profession. We are
grateful to have had his presence in
our midst.
El; *1
The Rehnquist Court continued from page 8
to avoid constitutional difficulties.The
Rehnquist Court does not actually do
that; it has produced a different sort of
nondelegation canon, one that gives
the courts less power: a clear-statement
rule with regard to claims of large-
scale, consequential delegations. This
idea is present in a number of Chevron
cases and is at the heart of Brown &
Williamson.
Once again, in practice, the Court's
interpretive approach will usually have
anti-regulation consequences, as it did
in Brown & Williamson. Like any clear
statement rule, it makes it harder for
Congress to do the thing that requires a
clear statement. However, two features
dilute this effect quite significantly. First,
this principle does not require Congress
to make a clear substantive decision,
which is hard for Congress to do. It
requires only that Congress clearly fail
Administrative and Regulatory Law News
to make a substantive decision and punt
to the agency. Historically, Congress has
been up to that challenge. Second, the
anti-regulation consequences are
contingent. In a deregulatory age, the
effect could be the opposite.
Conclusion
The Court that emerges from this
review is more timid and deferential
than the standard account would have
it. As Richard Lazarus has said in a
different context, the Rehnquist Court
is truly "Rehnquist's Court"; its admin-
istrative law doctrines match the early
opinions of the ChiefJustice, not the
self-aggrandizing approach one would
expect from the hegemonic Court that
is often described (and decried).
If the Court is working a revolution,
it is doing so by baby steps and through
12
indirection.Time and again we see an
official doctrine that is on the surface
deferential and hands-off.Then,
beneath the surface, one sees not a
whole other story, but rather some
subtle ways in which things are not
quite as they seem.Yet these are partial,
indirect, and not especially effective.
This description may be truer of the
Court's work in general than is usually
recognized. It's a better story if the
Supreme Court has gone berserk and
its decisions are of monumental impor-
tance, but an examination of the dry
and dusty land of administrative law
supports those who see the Court as a
nonextremist institution, whose
boldest doctrinal forays are in the areas
with the slightest practical conse-
quences and which is in the
mainstream of the overall legal and
political culture. C)
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The First Administrative Law Institute:
A Resounding Success
By Ottoj Hetzel*
t was a standing room only crowd
in the auditorium for the start of
the inaugural Administrative Law &
Regulatory Practice Institute: "Making
Agency Law Through Rulemaking."
Following opening remarks by the
Section Chair, Randy May, and
Program ChairJohn HardinYoung, the
program kicked off with a dynamic
two-session, tour-de-force lecture on
"EverythingYou Need to Know to
Effectively Participate in Agency Rule-
making" by RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., Lyle
T Alverson Professor of Law, George
Washington University Law School,
and renowned author ofAdministrative
LawTreatise (4th Ed.) and co-author
ofAdministrative Law and Process (3rd
Ed.).
Pierce's informal "class room" style
of presentation during the two
morning sessions and his interaction
with attendees in answering questions
as he went along made for an enter-
taining and informative performance
for the unexpectedly large turnout of
some 300 persons attending.
Professor Pierce provided a down-
to-earth discourse on the relevant legal
issues, the mechanics of rulemaking,
and the potential points of legal chal-
lenge to rules. His two sessions
spanned almost three hours, allowing
him to cover: agency power to issue
rules; choices between rulemaking and
adjudication; the significance of various
types of rules, informal, formal, and
hybrid; exemptions from rulemaking;
petitions for rulemaking; negotiated
rulemaking; and judicial review.
He also covered such sophisticated
points as the importance of ensuring that
rules ultimately generated are consistent
with the initial justifications set forth in
the original explanation for the proposed
rules. Ensuring that final products are
* Professor Emeritus,Wayne State University
Laws School.
Section Chair-Elect Eleanor Kinney, Program Chair and Former Section Chair Jack Young, Federal Circuit
ChiefJudge Paul R. Michel, Section Chair Rand), May, and DC Circuit ChiefJudge Douglas H. Ginsburg
at the FirstAnnualAdninistrative Lau, & Regulatory Practice Institute.
consistent with the original basis set forth
in the request for comments, he stressed,
is needed to head off challenges on the
basis that the final rules were themselves
arbitrary and capricious. He also
outlined the applicable statutes of limita-
tions that apply to such challenges, which
are independent of contentions that arise
later and relate to how an agency ulti-
mately applies its rules.
At lunch, the personable Honorable
PatWood, III, Chairman of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), provided illustrations of the
rulemaking issues his agency had
encountered during his tenure. He
also stressed the important role that
legal counsel play in making this an
effective process.
The afternoon sessions were based
on a case study of. ilotor Ihicde lau-
_facturers Association v. State Farm M\lIutual
Automobile hIsurance Company, 463 U.S.
29, 57 (1983), which set the standard
for review of agency rulemaking. The
study also provided a common set of
facts to stimulate discussions in the
smaller group breakout sessions that
followed, where specific issues and
agency practices were discussed in the
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context of a designated agency, such as
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) or FERC. In these smaller
groups, each participant had an oppor-
tunity to discuss their perceptions and
concerns relevant to the required
process applicable to that agency and
to seek guidance in handling specific
types of situations having broader
application to other government agen-
cies, as well.
Afterwards, a panel containing the
major players involved in the State Farm
case provided a unique opportunity to
learn about the tactical approaches
taken by the various parties to that rule-
making. The panel also contributed
their candid, reflective analysis of how
they performed in that particular rule-
making given the critical economic and
safety effects of what was then perceived
as a contentious set of requirements to
deal with this safety issue. It was an
intriguing vision into how parties
prepare for and represent their interests
in such matters.
A Judicial Reception for all partici-
pants concluded the first day's events, It
continued out page 24
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Review of Government 2. 0:
Using Technology to Improve Education, Cut Red Tape,
Reduce Gridlock, and Enhance Democracy
By William Eggers, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, 243 pages.
Review By Ronald A. Cass*
xperience, people say, is what
allows us to make good judg-
ments. And how do we get
experience? By making bad judgments.
Those who fail to learn from experi-
ence make the same mistakes repeatedly.
Those who learn from experience get
to make entirely new mistakes.
In his new book, Government 2. 0, Bill
Eggers provides his assessment of our
experience with technology and the
lessons we should learn from it. The
book is an interesting romp through
some of the mistakes government has
made in its use of technology, some of
the successes government has had in its
use of technology, and some of the possi-
bilities that are open to government now.
Although its conclusions - and certainly
its optimism about technology's potential
role in government - will not be
congenial to every reader, the stories
about instances in which government
uses technology especially well or badly
will engage those interested in govern-
ment. Eggers draws his examples from
federal, state, and local government and
combines them with thoughtful discus-
sion about what governments can,
should, and might do with new tech-
nologies to change the way it works.
Eggers' subject is large. The best way
to tackle it is to ask what technology has
to offer to different government func-
tions. One function is to gather, process,
and disseimnate information. Put aside
the gathering and processing side for a
moment. The use of technology to
expand those capacities is problematic in
some respects, though Eggers persua-
sively shows that technology's enhanced
* President, Cass & Associates, PC, a legal
consulting firm in Great Falls,Va.; past chair,
Section ofAdministrative Law.
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ability to gather and manipulate infor-
mation can be a boon to a host of
government services (take, for example,
Bill Bratton's use of statistics to improve
the operation of the NewYork police
department). The thin edge of technol-
ogy's usefulness to improving
government can be seen in its role in
disseminating information. One thing
we want from government is informa-
tion. We want to know where to go to
get things done, to get a passport or
register a car, to find a national park
along the way, or to get help with our
Social Security payments. We want to
know which tariff classification to use for
a product we are importing or what
rulemaking proceedings are coming up
in the Department ofTransportation.
Government is an enormous storehouse
of information as well as a vast set of
activities and decisions that affect us.
Here, technology can help. Any lawyer
who was educated using theWest system's
Decennial Digests (much less its Centen-
nial Digests) can appreciate the advance
thatWestLaw offers in doing research.
From your home or office or car, you can
search a huge databank electronically,
asking many more questions much more
quickly to see what cases fit your needs
than you ever could do leafing through
key cites and indices. From providing a
government-wide regulatory index to
organizing information about state
government services in a readily accessi-
ble fashion, technology affords many ways
to improve government's efficiency in
providing information to citizens. Even if
there are still dinosaurs among us who
won't avail themselves of anything that
doesn't look and feel like paper, Eggers'
prescriptions here are almost certainly
worth following. Government can do
much more to make its information user
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friendly, and technology is surely our
friend in this endeavor.
A second thing we can ask of technol-
ogy is to improve the services
government offers. Consider your local
Department of MotorVehicles. The
typical DMV requires that you show up
in person to renew your car's registra-
tion, your driver's license, etc. The typical
DMV also is organized in a manner that
virtually guarantees a wait that is more
suited to archaeology than to modern
life. I've been to MotorVehicle offices
where the wait is timed in days rather
than hours. The very concept in some of
these offices is to discourage anyone with
a regular job or any meaningful or pleas-
urable activity in his or her life from
trying to accomplish the task they had in
mind when they first showed up at the
DMV Technology allows simple transac-
tions to be done over the internet in a
quick and painless way. As Eggers says,
paying parking tickets, renewing your
license or registration, or doing a
hundred other things you must do with
government can be done easily over the
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internet. And doing that saves money for
government, money for its citizens, and
reduces the friction now generated by
our trip to the DMV. The only real
losers in this change vill be the firms
selling ulcer medications. Eggers
suggests numerous ways to improve
every day government services, and he
makes a strong case for a xide array of
these changes. The prototype for the
vision of improved-service-through-
technology is the SpeedPass or EZ Pass.
Anyone who used to queue up for traffic
tolls, waiting for a small number of toll
takers to make change for the drivers
who can't quite find \xhere the right
dollar bills are in their wallets can appre-
ciate the difference it makes xxwhen you
can zip past an electronic toll booth.
The most controversial parts of the
book will be those that deal with some
of the processes of governance and
education, where Eggers' proposed solu-
tions for current problems no doubt xill
find skeptics. Txvo of those he targets are
education and voting. He rightly
observes that both processes - which lie
at the core of what government does -
are troubled. At the purely technical
level, voting is the less troubled, as it
generally proceeds with relative reliabil-
ity. It becomes problematic xvhen
elections are so terribly close that the
error rate in vote counting can affect the
outcome. All voting methods have
defects - confusing voters, miscounting
votes by over- or under-counting, or,
worst of all, misclassifyig votes (count-
ing a vote forA as a vote for B). The
defects of some methods were the
subject of intense scrutiny in the after-
math of the 2000 presidential election,
but most of the fixes for the perceived
defects have turned out to provide no
greater reliabiliht than the methods they
replace. Eggers believes that technology
can cure the problems, and describes a
means for voting that he thinks will
provide the clarity, certainty and reliabil-
ity needed. It is far from clear that this
can be done without introducing new
problems, but it is at least a plausible
claim. To his credit, Eggers is more tech-
nocrat than visionary on this score -
meaning that he limits his proposals to
the more pragmatic ones, leaving less
likelihood that unintended (and
unwanted) consequences xvNil outweigh
the benefits.
The plans he lays out for improving
education are apt to provoke more
dissent. Of course, every plan for improv-
ing education seems to provoke dissent.
Eggers starts xvith the sound observation
that schools often present learning in a
context that is far from inspiring. My
own favorite example is history. Tell a kid
you've got stories about war, intrigue,
feuds, battles, greed, revolution and
discovery - you've got a ready audience.
Then hand him or her a standard history
textbook. It's all over. The book has
taken every shred of human interest and
everthing that xxould fascinate a child
out of the story. Further, the xvriting by
committee that typifies these books
sounds as if human interest is absent
because no humans participated in
producing the book. Eggers gives a
different example, linked to technology:
One of the most exasperating things
for parents is watching their nine-
year-old kid master an exceedingly
complex, multilevel computer
game-and then flunk math. Obvi-
ousl, their child has an aptitude for
learning, an aptitude that the
computer game designer, but not the
math curriculum developer, was able
to bring out.
Eggers is clearly right that different tools
than are used at school, including tools
that rely on technology, can provide a
richer set of learning possibilities, a set
more likely to include something that
attracts the attention and energy of each
particular child. Curricula that aim at a
one-size-fits-all solution to education xvill
miss the opportunix to engage children
eager to learn. The learning program
almost inevitably xvill not be right for
most of the kids. Eggers is right as xvell to
see the promise of technologies that allow
more efficient engagement on an individ-
ual basis - that don't require a teacher to
guide the individual child's learning, so
that twenty-five children can go in
twent-five different directions at the
same time. It is far from clear, however,
how much of the problem is technologi-
cal at its root, rather than being the
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product of the bureaucratic and political
forces that promote centralized, public
education for relatively large, heteroge-
neous classes as the basic educational
paradigm. It may well be, for example,
that the big issue is not technology but the
restriction of educational competition.
Where we have competition in education
now, it seems to work better, and also
seems to produce a far greater diversity of
educational options than wx here we limit
the educational alternatives. Still, Eggers
may be right that we can make improve-
ments xvithin any model by
understanding -xhat technology can do.
The most skeptical responses to Eggers'
work wxill come from those concerned
about the privacx and securitx problems
that come along with the nexv technolo-
gies Eggers favors. Eggers recognizes
these concerns, but he is more sanguine
about the solutions to them than many
critics may be. Some problems that
technophobes are concerned with may
be exaggerated simply because we focus
on the risks of the nev while accepting
the old without question. We may be
vary of nex technologies that actually
present smaller risks than older technolo-
gies. Consider what happens with your
credit card in a restaurant. You hand it to
someone you don't know He disappears
with it for some time. You don't know
xxhere he's gone, what he's done, or who
else has seen your card. But you probably
don't worry much about it. When xou
give your credit card information to
someone over the internet, you may have
far greater safeguards built in. But the
information is somewhere you can't
fathom for a longer period of time -
you're not sure just how long - and
potentially available to a far xider set of
folks. There's reason for concern, even if
xxwe can t filly assess the risks. And similar
concerns attend a great amount of the
proposed uses of technology.
After all is said and done. however,
Eggers has provided a rich compendium
of potential uses of technology to
improve government and a thoughtful
discussion of the costs and benefits of the
nex technologx. Anyone interested in
administrative law of the coming centur -
xxwould be well advised to take a look at
this book. C>
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The 2005 Spring Meeting
s Spring Meetings go, the 2005
Spring Meeting in Savannah has
to rank with the best of them.
The setting was the Westin Savannah
Harbor Golf Resort & Spa, home of the
Liberty Mutual Legends of Golf, a major
stop on the men's senior professional golf
tour. Guided tours, outings for spouses
and an opportunity to take in Savannah's
best restaurants and waterfront shops
rounded out the experience.
Competing with all these wonderful
distractions were a variety of panels and
speakers on big-picture, long-range,
forward-looking topics.
The Future of State
Administrative Law
First on the weekend agenda was a
panel on "State Administrative Law
Themes for the 21st Century" moderated
by former Section Chair Ron Levin. Lois
E Oakley, Chief State Administrative Law
Judge, Georgia Office of State Adminis-
trative Hearings, commented on the
movement in states toward adoption of
central administrative hearing panels -
twenty-eight so far by her count. She
predicted that the strengths of central
panels - independence, uniformity,
accountability and efficiency - would
eventually fuiel an expansion in central
panel jurisdiction to include matters
traditionally reserved for the courts.
James F Flanagan, Oliver Ellsworth
Professor of Federal Practice at the
University of South Carolina School of
Law, and the reporter for the Rules of
Procedure for South Carolina's central
panel of administrative law judges, agreed
that central panels have become
extremely effective but expressed
concern that their use creates a discon-
nect with executive branch policy, that
central panels lack any political responsi-
bility.Judge Oakley, on the other hand,
saw the relative lack of political influence
on central panels as improving impartial-
ity. Neither, however, left any doubt that
adoption of central panels was the defi-
nite trend.
Paul G.Afonso, Chairman of the Mass-
achusetts Department of
Administrative and Regulatory Lan' News
Telecommunications and
Energy, conveyed his reserva-
tions about the emergence of
"corporate federalism" -
spurred by Enron and facili-
tated by Sarbanes-Oxley - that
threatens to usurp the tradi-
tional role of states as overseers
of corporate integrity. Mostly
though, his remarks centered
on how the states are becom-
ing advocates before federal
regulators and how he sees FormerA
states moving toward interstate with Ran
greenhouse gas agreements.
H. Lane Kneedler of Reed
Smith LLP appeared as an appointee to
the National Conference of Corrms-
sioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL). NCCUSL is currently in
the process of contemplating revisions to
the Model State APA. Some of the
matters that the drafting committee is
expected to address are: the finality of
central panel decisions, the boundaries
on agency head consultations with staff,
administrative civil penalty provisions,
suspension and revocation, precedent
publication criteria, rulemaking effi-
ciency, and scope ofjudicial review.
Priorities for a New ACUS
Immediately following the state
administrative law panel, Section Chair
Randy May moderated a panel on "An
Administrative Law Agenda for the
Twenty-First Century:What Should a
New ACUS Do." Panelists were asked to
recite their short list of major priorities
for the recently reauthorizedAdministra-
tive Conference of the United States.
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Fellow in Law and
Government at American University's
Washington College of Law and former
ACUS Research Director, listed three:
de-ossifying rulemaking, resolving the
tension between the need for openness
and national security, and helping agen-
cies realize efficiency gains.
Paul R.Verkuil, former Section Chair
and Professor at Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, believes a reconstituted
ACUS should examine the need for
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mbassador Philip Lader and Section Chair Randy May,
dy's wife Laurie, at the Saturday dinner
limits on the types of governmental
functions that may be contracted out to
private entities.
Former Section Chair JackYoung of
Sandier, Reiff &Young, PC, advocated a
role for ACUS as facilitator of change in
government's perspective to align with
that of its current customers, its future
stakeholders.
Past Section Chair Philip J. Harter,
currently a professor at the University of
Missouri School of Law and formerly a
senior staff attorney forACUS, would
have the new ACUS take a hard look at
the relationship between agencies and
courts and the relationship between
government and the private sector.
Finally, Loren A. Smith, Senior Judge
of the United States Court of Federal
Claims, would advise ACUS to assist
agencies in realizing the potential of
electronic forums and help agencies
simplify their processes in economically
meaningful ways that enable the private
sector to better manage regulatory risk.
Interstate Compact APA Project
The Saturday Council meeting
featured a panel on the Section's Inter-
state Compact APA Project.The topic
was judicial review and enforcement.
The panel was moderated by project
co-chair Bill Morrow who noted that in
many, perhaps most, cases the courts have
adopted an arbitrary-and-capricious stan-
dard of review when passing on compact
agency action, but the reasons for doing
continued on page 28
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Section sponsored and co-sponsored CLE programs during the 2005 Annual Meeting include:
* Ethics for Environmental Practitioners
* Judicial Security in the Post 9/11 Environment
* Criminal Penalties for Regulatory Crimes
* The Lawyer's Role in Disaster & Homeland
Security Planning
* Federalism & Regulatory Treatment of
Emerging Communications Technologies
* Federal ADR & Confidentiality
* When Local Government Makes Land Use
and Environmental Decisions
* Civil and Administrative Proceedings as
Tools in Criminal Investigations
* Continuing the Dialogue: Congress and
the Judiciary
* How Federal Bank Regulators Look at
Outsourcing Arrangements
* Careers in National Security Law
* GuestWorkers, Permanent Residents or
Mass Deportations: Immigration Reform
Section Reception and Dinner at the University Club of Chicago
Friday, August 5,2005
Guest Speaker:
Professor Richard A. Epstein,
University of Chicago School of Law
Sponsors of the Administrative Law
Section Annual Meeting
:FOLEY
Visit www.abanet.org/adminlaw for complete meeting information and the latest program updates.
Summer 2005 ~-1dini,,istratiie aiid IZegula tory Laid' 7\eu's
Admniiiistrative and Regulator}, Liu, YeiusSummer 2005
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Debates over the Propriety of Chevron Deference
In Smith v. City ofJackson, Mississippi, --- U.S. ---, 125 S. Ct.
1536 (March 30,2005), the Supreme Court concluded 8-0
(ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not participate) that the plaintiffs'
disparate-impact age discrimination case under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) would have to be
dismissed. That unanimity of result, however, belies the very
different approaches to interpreting the ADEA that informed
the three resulting opinions, particularly with respect to how
much deference to give the EEOC on the issue of whether the
ADEA permitted disparate impact claims. Even the five
Justices who agreed that the ADEA authorized such claims split
4-1 regarding their interpretive reasoning.
In the plurality opinion by Justice Stevens, he andJustices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer based their conclusion that the
ADEA supported disparate-impact claims on their own
textual analysis of the ADEA, referring to the EEOC's inter-
pretation only for ending confirmation of their own view. The
plurality began by analyzing the ADEA's language in compari-
son to TitleVII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, noting that
"when Congress uses the same language in two statutes having
similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after
the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended
that text to have the same meaning in both statutes." Id. at
1541 (citations omitted). It emphasized that in Griggs v. Duke
Pover Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court had unanimously
interpreted the relevant language ofTideVII to allow disparate
impact claims,"not[ing] that the [EEOC], which had enforce-
ment responsibility, had issued guidelines that accorded with
our view." Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541 (citing Griggs, 401 US. at
433-34). While the "opinion in Griggs relied primarily on the
purposes of the Act, buttressed by the fact that the EEOC had
endorsed the same view," the Court later determined that its
view ofTitleVII was also "the better reading of the statutory
text." Id. at 1542 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 97, 991 (1988)). As a result," Griggs, which interpreted the
identical text at issue here, thus strongly suggests that a
disparate-impact theory should be cognizable under the
ADEA," especially given the Courts ofAppeals' uniform inter-
pretation oftheADEA to that effect. Id. at 1542-43. Only at
the very end of its analysis did the plurality also "note that both
the Department of Labor, which initially drafted the legisla-
tion, and the EEOC, which is the agency charged by Congress
with responsibility for implementing the statute.... have
consistently interpreted the ADEA to authorize relief on a
disparate-impact theory." Id. at 1544.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indi-
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Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment specifically to argue
that the EEOC's interpretation was entitled to Chevron defer-
ence. He agreed with all of the plurality's interpretive reasoning
"but would find it a basis, not for independent determination
of the disparate-impact question, bit for deferral to the reason-
able views of the"EEOC. Id. at 1546 J. Scalia, concurring).
According tojustice Scalia,"[t]his is an absolutely classic case
for deference to agency interpretation," because the EEOC was
clearly delegated rulemaking authority, had promulgated its
interpretation of the ADEA through notice-and-comment
rulemaking, and had defended that interpretation in numerous
court cases. Id. at 1546-47 (J. Scalia, concurring). Justice Scalia
moreover concluded that "for the reasons given by the plurality
opinion, [the EEOC's] position is eminently reasonable," which
should have been sufficient to resolve the case. Id. at 1549 c].
Scalia, concurring).
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas concurred in the
final judgment dismissing the case for failure to state a claim,
but they disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
ADEA allowed disparate-impact claims. These Justices relied
heavily on the ADEA's "reasonable factors other than age"
provision and legislative history that indicated that" [t]he
drafters of the ADEA and the Congress that enacted it under-
stood that age discrimination was qualitatively different from
the kinds of discrimination addressed by TitleVII, and that
many legitimate employment practices would have a disparate
impact on older workers" Id. at 1552 (J. O'Connor, concur-
ring), to conclude that the ADEA did not allow such claims. In
reaching that conclusion, moreover, these three Justices also
concluded that the EEOC's interpretations of the ADEA
allowing disparate impact claims deserved no deference. They
argued that the plurality andJustice Scalia were relying on a
1968 Labor Bulletin and a 1981 EEOC policy statement. Id. at
1557-58 (J. O'Connor, concurring). Because the Labor
Bulletin did not construe the ADEA's prohibitory provisions
and spoke purely in terms of intentional discrimination in
hiring, and because the EEOC policy statement was focused on
the "reasonable factors other than age" safe havenJustice
O'Connor "would give no weight to the statements in ques-
tion." Id. at 1558 (J. O'Connor, concurring). In particular, the
EEOC "has not actually exercised its delegated authority to
resolve any ambiguity in the relevant provision's text, much less
done so in a reasonable or persuasive manner. As to the specific
provision presented, therefore, the regulation is not entitled to
any deference." Id. at 1559 (J. O'Connor, concurring).
Decisions with Federalism Implications
The Supreme Court issued a series of decisions this quarter
regarding the proper relationship between state and federal law
and judicial decisions. The first of these was Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., --- U.S. --- , 125 S. Ct. 1517
(March 30,2005), in which the Supreme Court limited the
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scope of one of its appellate review doctrines with implications
for federal-state relations, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits suits in the lower federal
courts that seek to overturn state-court judgments. However,
the lower courts often confuse the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
with normal principles of issue and claim preclusion that apply
when state courts have ruled on issues relevant to later federal
litigation, as was the case in Ex.xon Mobil.
Exxon Mobil was at heart a royalty dispute arising out of
joint ventures in Saudi Arabia. Injuly 2000, Saudi Basic
Industries sued ExxonMobil in the Delaware Superior Court
seeking a declaratory judgment that the royalties it charged
were proper. Two weeks later, ExxonMobil sued Saudi Basic
Industries in the United States District Court for the District
of NewJersey, alleging that Saudi Basic Industries had over-
charged ExxonMobil. ExxonMobil answered the state-court
compliant in January 2002, and the state suit xxvent to trial in
March 2003, resulting in a S400 million jury verdict in Exxon-
Mobil's favor. Before the trial, however, Saudi Basic Industries
moved to dismiss the federal lawsuit, and the federal district
court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal of that
denial, the Third Circuit reversed, determining that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over ExxonMobil's
federal claims on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
because the state court had already decided those claims. The
Supreme Court reversed again, holding that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine "is confined to cases of the kind from which
the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-courtjudgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judg-
ments." Id. at 1521-22. Otherwise, concurrent state and
federal proceedings are allovable, subject to comity and
abstention doctrines, and "[d]isposition of the federal action,
once the state-court adjudication is complete, would be
governed by preclusion law." Id. at 1527.
States also benefited from the Court's decision in Bates v
DowAgrosciences LLC., --- U.S. --- , 125 S. Ct. 1788 (April 27,
2005), in which the Court held, 7-2, that the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) does not
preempt state law claims for defective design, defective manu-
facture, negligent testing, breach of express warranty, or
violation of the Texas Deception Trade Practices Act; the
Court remanded the issues of whether FIFRA preempts sate-
law fraud and failure to warn claims. The plaintifs xxwere 29
peanut farmers in Texas who alleged that Dow's new pesticide
"Strongarm," a weed killer, destroyed their peanut crops in
2000. According to the plaintifli, Dow knew or should have
known that Strongarm stunted crop growth when soil pH was
greater than 7.0, as in typical in western Texas; nevertheless,
Strongarm's federally approved label and Dow's sales agents
both asserted that "use of Strongarm is recommended in all
areas where peanuts are grown."
Dow defended on the ground that its conditional registration
of the pesticide with the EPA under FIFRA, wx hich gave Dow
permission to sell Strongarm, preempted the farmers' state-law
claims. The relevant language of FIFRA dictates that states
"shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for
labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those
requires under" the Act. 7 U.S.C. 5 136v(b). Focusing on the
scope of"requirements" in this provision, the Court fashioned a
two-factor test:
For a particular state rule to be pre-empted, it must satisfy
two conditions. First, it must be a requirement'for labeling or
packaging"; rules governing the design of a product, for
example, are not preempted. Second, it must impose a label-
ing or packaging requirement that is "in addition to or different
from those required under this subchapter."
Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1798. Most of the plamtifs' state-lav claimrs
did not satisf- the first condition: "Rules that require manufac-
turers to design reasonably safe products, to use due care in
conducting appropriate testing of their products, to market
products free of manufacturing defects, and to honor their
express warranties or contractual commitments plainly do not
qualify as requirements for'labeling or packaging."' Id. The
fraud and negligence failure-to-warn claims, however, were
based on state-law rules that qualified as requirements for label-
ing and packaging, because they wx ere premised on claims that
Strongarm's approved label contained false statements and inad-
equate warnings. The plaintiffs nevertheless argued that their
state-lawv claims imposed requirements that were equivalent to
FIFRA's mandates that pesticide labels not contain "false or
misleading" statements or inadequate instructions or warnings
and hence that the second requirement for FIFRA preemption
had not been met. Because this issue had not been adequately
briefed, the Court remanded it for lower court resolution.
A day earlier, however, the Court allowed the federal criminal
x-ire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, to displace the common
law revenue rule in Pasquantino vL _ired States,- U.S.-, 125
S. Ct. 1766 (April 26.2005). Against the convicted criminal
defendants' argument that "[s]tatutes xxwhich invade the common
law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention
of long-established and familiar principles," Id. at 1773 [quoting
United Statcs r Texas, 507 U.S. 529,534 (1993)], the Court
emphasized that" [t]his presumption is ... no bar to a construc-
tion that conflicts with a common-law rule if the statute 'speaks
directly'to the question addressed by the common law." Id. at
1773-74 [quoting United States r Texas, 507 U.S. 529,534
(1993)]. In order to determine whether "Congress intended to
exempt the present prosecution from the broad reach of the
continued on ncxt page
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wire fraud statute, [the Court had to] find that the commnon-law
revenue rule clearly barred such a prosecution,"judged from the
state of common law in 1952, when Congress enacted the wire
fraud statute. Id. at 1774. Because the Court could find no
evidence that, by 1952, the comminon law revenue rule "barred
the United States from prosecuting a fraudulent scheme to
evade foreign taxes," neither that rule nor its purposes barred the
criminal prosecution. Id. at 1774-81.
Federal interests also triumphed over state interests regarding
interstate sales of alcohol. In May, the Court determined, 5-4,
that Michigan laws that prohibited direct sales from out-of-state
wineries to Michigan residents while allowing such sales from
Michigan wineries violated the Dormant Commerce Clause
by discriminating against out-of-state commerce. Granholm v.
Heal, --- U.S.---,--- S. Ct.---,2005WL 1130571 (May 16,
2005). The Court's Commerce Clause analysis was unremark-
able, given that the Michigan laws facially discriminated against
out-of-state commerce. The important federalism aspect of the
case was the majority's determination that states' powers under
the 21 ,Amendment did not trump the dormant Commerce
Clause. Thus, state constitutional power to regulate sales of
alcohol remains subordinate to the federal insistence that there
be no barriers to trade between states. C-.)
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By William SJordan Il*
FACA: D.C. Circuit Dilutes While 9th Circuit Signals
Possible End to Some Claims
The first Bush Administration practically began with a
dispute over the secret workings of the National Energy Policy
Development Group (NEPDG), which wxas headed byVice
President Cheney.As the second Bush Administration begins,
an en banc D.C. Circuit decision has finally resolved that
dispute in a decision that further nminizes the significance of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) as a device for
achieving open government.The Ninth Circuit, meanwhile,
issued and then withdrew an opinion holding that there is no
private right of action to enforce FACA.
Soon after his first inauguration, President Bush appointed
the NEPDG to develop a national energy policy.The meetings
and even the membership of the NEPDG were not revealed to
the public.Asserting that energy industry representatives vere
active members of and participants in the NEPDG, the Sierra
Club and others challenged the secret nature of the NEPDG as
a violation of FACA.After a detour to the Supreme Court to
resolve issues related to the role of claims of executive privilege,
Cheney v. US. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004), the D.C.
Circuit ultimately addressed the merits of the FACA claim in li
re: Cheney, 2005 WL 1083346 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
By this point in the litigation, the issue -vas whether the
private participants in the NEPDG constituted members of the
body for the purposes of FACA. Since bodies composed
entirely of fill-tine federal employees are exempt from FACA,
the status of the private participants would determine whether
the statute applied to the NEPDG.
Emphasizing the "severe separation of powers problems"
inherent in applying FACA to a body advising the Executive
Office of the President, the court first said that it must construe
the statute strictly.With that admonition, it held that "such a
committee is composed wholly of federal officials if the Presi-
dent has given no one other than a federal official a vote in or, if
the committee acts by consensus, a veto over the conmmittee's
decisions."Administration affidavits stated that the private
participants had neither a vote nor a veto, and the challengers
could not show otherwise.
The result is a gaping loophole in FACA, which undermines
both its already fading significance as a tool of open government
and even its role in managing agency resources, as discussed, for
example, in Public Citizen v. Department ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440,
445-446,453-454 (1989).Any agency, or the President, can
avoid the openness and other strictures of FACA simply by
creating an advisory body in which any private participants offi-
cially cannot vote. Since the balanced representation
* C. Blake McDowell Professor of LawThe University ofAkron School
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requirements of FACA would not apply the private participants
in the advisory group could be drawn entirely from a single
industry or other interest, as was true of the NEPDG. In such a
group, there would be relatively little need for votes or vetoes
since the participants would already be in general agreement. In
effect, this decision sanctions traditional old-boy networks, in
which votes were not taken, but influence was enormous.
In another intriguing FACA development, the Ninth Circuit
held in Ulmshardt v. FederalJudicial Qualifications Committee, 401
E3d 1014 (9"h Cir. 2005), that the FACA does not create a
private right of action.The District Court had reached the
same conclusion in the first of many decisions in the In re:
Cheney litigationJudicial I atch, Inc. i National Energy Policy
Development Group, 219 ESupp.2d 20,33 (D.D.C. 2002), but
that litigation had continued as a mandamus action.Two
months after issuing the above Manshardt opinion, the Ninth
Circuit withdrew it, stating that it could not be cited as prece-
dent. manshardt n Federal udicial Qualfications Committee, 2005
WL 1119626 (9,h Cir. 2005). In its place, the Ninth Circuit
issued a fairly straightforward opinion on the merits (denying a
challenge to cotnruttees organized by the two California sena-
tors and a private laxVver to advise the president on
appointments to judgeships and U.S. attorney positions), while
noting that the question of private rights to enforce FACA is
still an open question, and citing several cases on the issue.
M Ianshardt v. FederalJudicial Qualffications Committee, 2005 WL
1119633, n. 3 (9t Cir. 2005).The lesson of the .1,uishardt devel-
opments is that the availability of a private right of action under
FACA is very much a live question.This may not matter,
howcever, because reviexx will usually be available under the
APA or through an action for mandamus.
FCC Guidance Documents: D.C. Circuit Applies
Traditional Notice-&-Comment Test to One and New
Non-APA "Crucial Statutory Element" Test to Other
It seems so simple.When you change cell phone companies,
you can keep your telephone number. In regulatory terms, you
can "port" your number to the nex company. Less well known
is the fact that you can also port your traditional "wireline" tele-
phone number to either a vireless or a wvireline companv.The
complexities of the regulatory scheme have resulted in various
informally issued FCC guidance documents. In companion
cases from the D.C. Circuit, one guidance document survives
review under fairly traditional analysis.Another is remanded in
a decision that both (1) demonstrates the procedural vitality of
the requirement to prepare a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
and (2) finds a legislative rulemaking requirement in the
substantive statute even where notice and comment would not
be required by the APA.
continued on next page
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As it began implementing the statutory mandate to require
portability, the FCC used the notice and comnent rulemaking
process to issue two "orders," both of which are "'rules" under
the APA.These orders established two basic principles. First,
wireline and wireless carriers are required to provide "number
portability" between companies. Second, the various carriers
are not required to provide "location portability," which the
FCC defined as "the ability of users of telecommunications
services to retain existing telecommunications numbers ...
when moving from one physical location to another."
The interplay of these principles was fairly straightforward
with respect to portability between traditional wireline
companies.As one might expect, such portability is not
required unless the companies essentially share the same
relatively small geographic area.Thus, you can't move from
Washington, D.C., to Phoenix and take your wireline
number to your new wireline phone.
More difficult questions arose in two areas. First, was
number portability between wireless companies required
where a customer had moved to a new location? Second, was
number portability required between a wireline company and
a wireless company with no physical presence in the wireline
company's relevant geographic area? The FCC answered both
questions without expressly complying with the requirements
for notice and comment rulemaking.
As to the first question, the wireless industry petitioned for a
ruling that local companies (both wireline and wireless) had a
duty to port their numbers to wireless companies as long as their
service areas overlapped.The FCC invited public comment on
the petition and later issued an "order" adopting the proposed
position. In Central Texas Telephone Cooperative, Inc. v. FCC, 402
E3d 205 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the local companies challenged the
order on the ground that it violated the notice and comment
and other requirements governing legislative rulemaking.
Before reaching the procedural challenge, the court discussed
the question of whether the agency's action constituted adjudi-
cation or rulemaking, usually not a notable issue. In this case,
however, the wireless industry had petitioned under an FCC
regulation that referred to 5 U.S.C. 554(e), which involves
adjudications.After noting that there is some authority for the
proposition a 554(e) petition may be used in informal adjudica-
tion, the court assumed, as had the parties, that the FCC
issuance constituted a "rule" for purposes of the APA.
In addressing the procedural argument, the court emphasized
that an agency statement can be an interpretive rule only if it is
"interpreting something."The court quotes Professor Anthony's
argument that "The substance of the derived proposition must
flow fairly from the substance of the existing document." But
then it adds,"If, despite an agency's claim, a rule cannot fairly be
viewed as interpreting - even incorrectly - a statute or a regulation,
the rule is not an interpretive rule exempt from notice-and-
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comment rulemaking." (Emphasis supplied.) This is a useful clar-
ification of the debate over interpretive rules. In determining
whether an agency statement qualifies for the interpretative
statement exemption from notice and comment, the crucial
question is whether the statement is interpretive in nature, not
whether it is correct. If a statement was developed using the
interpretive method, relying on language, history, and the like, it
qualifies for the interpretive statement exemption even if it is
substantively incorrect.
Ultimately, however, the court applied the well-known test
of American Mining Company v. MSHA, asking whether the
FCC statement "repudiates or is irreconcilable with" one of the
previous legislative rules.The court held that the statement was
consistent with the FCC's rejection of"location portability"
because the customer's location was not relevant to wireless-to-
wireless portability.This was simply number portability as long
as the customer was somewhere within the service areas of the
two companies. Reflecting established doctrine, the court said
that such an interpretive rule can change existing conduct. It
also expressly repudiated the "substantial effects" or "substantial
impact" tests that it had once used to resolve these issues.
In US.TelecomAss'n v. FCC, 400 F3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the
D.C. Circuit resolved the more interesting questions raised by
the problem ofwireline to wireless portability. First, following
the American Mining Company principle noted above, the court
held that requiring a wireline company to port its number to a
wireless company outside its geographic area was inconsistent
with the FCC's rejection of"location portability."Thus, the
statement did not qualify for the interpretive rule exception.
Moreover, the court held that the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act itself requires the agency to rely upon legislative
rulemaking.The Act requires number porting"'in accordance
with requirements prescribed by the Commission, ...
requirements that are to be 'implement[ed]'in "regulations."'
Thus, statements implementing the porting requirement are
by definition legislative rules.
Recognizing that it is not possible for legislative rules to
"address every conceivable question," the court articulated a
new test for determining whether, for the purpose of statu-
tory rulemaking requirements such as this one, the agency
must use legislative rulemaking. Referring to the facts at
hand, the court said,"the question of what Congress meant
by 'at the same location'... is not just any "conceivable ques-
tion.' Rather, it is a crucial statutory element of the portability
requirement itself...." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, there is
now a distinct test for determining when an agency must use
legislative rulemaking under a non-APA rulemaking require-
ment. Under this ruling, an agency cannot necessarily rely
upon the interpretive statement exception even if the excep-
tion would be available under the APA.
The court went on, however, to hold that the FCC's failure
to expressly conduct a notice and comment rulemaking
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proceeding constituted harmless error because the agency had
sought and considered comment on the industry petition that
resulted in the order. If the FCC thought it was off the hook
at that point, however, it had another thing coming.
The court ultimately held that although the agency had, in
effect, complied with notice and comment requirements, it
foundered on the additional requirement to prepare a Regu-
latory Flexibility Analysis concerning the effect of its rule on
small entities.The court prohibited the agency from imple-
menting the rule with respect to small entities.Thus, an
agency risks more than merely additional notice and
comment when it incorrectly relies on this (and presumably
other) exceptions to notice and comment.
D.C. Circuit Denies Chevron Deference, Strictly
Construes FCC Ancillary Jurisdiction
Congress has set a deadline of December 31,2006, to
compete the transition from analogTV broadcasting to digital
broadcasting. In a rulemaking related to that transition, the
FCC required that all new televisions and other equipment
capable of receiving a digital broadcast signal be equipped with
a "broadcast flag."The "broadcast flag" prevents the reception
equipment from redistributing the broadcast material.The
American Library Association challenged the rule as beyond
the FCC's jurisdiction. As discussed below, the D.C. Circuit in
American LibraryAss'n v. FCC, 2005WL 1047587 (D.C. Cir.
2005), concluded that the rule was invalid because it sought to
regulate broadcast receiving equipment after the point that the
broadcast had been transmitted and received.The decision
suggests an approach to attacking Chevron deference when the
issue is the scope of an agency's regulatory jurisdiction.
It is often difficult to determine the precise boundary of an
agency's regulatory jurisdiction. Perhaps the most well known
case addressing this sort of issue is Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
v. United States, in which the Supreme Court upheld the
Corps of Engineers'jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands under
the Clean Water Act. Noting the difficulty of determining
.'some point at which water ends and land begins," the Court
deferred to the agency's judgment that such wetlands "play a
key role in protecting and enhancing water quality," and must,
therefore, be subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction. The
Court emphasized "the Corps' and EPA's technical expertise"
in deferring to their conclusion.
The jurisdictional boundary issue is particularly acute for
the FCC due to the nature of broadcasting. It is not enough
for the FCC to control the broadcast signal itself, or even the
licensing of broadcast stations. It must also control the receiv-
ing apparatus in order to assure that the TVs or other receivers
available on the market are compatible with the broadcast
signal. For all of these, the FCC has express statutory author-
ity. Beyond these areas, however, there are broadcast-related
issues for which the agency's jurisdiction is not so clear, issues
as to which the agency is said to exercise "ancillary jurisdic-
tion."An example is what we now know as cable television.
United States v Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157,178
(1968).The FCC'S ancillary jurisdiction arises from its statu-
tory authority to "make such rules and regulations ... as may
be necessary in the execution of its functions."
Relying on its ancillary jurisdiction, the FCC adopted the
"broadcast flag" rule as part of its effort to promote the transi-
tion to digital broadcasting. In American LibraryAss'n v. FCC,
the D.C. Circuit held that the nile was not within the agency's
authority to regulate all interstate and foreign communication
by wire or radio."The essential problem was that any copying
or redistribution of a broadcast after its receipt by a television
would not constitute 'communication by wire or radio."
From a broader Administrative Law perspective, the court's
rejection of Chevron deference may have considerable influ-
ence.While this issue is comparable in some ways to the
wetlands jurisdiction question on which the Court deferred in
Riverside Bayvieu, Homes, the D.C. Circuit refused to defer.
Although the FCC is clearly authorized to issue rules with the
force of law, the threshold test of US. v. - lead, the court empha-
sized here that the agency must have been delegated authority
with respect to the particular area being regulated. Reading the
statute as limited to regulation of the apparatus at the point that
it receives the signal, the court found the broadcast flag rule to
be beyond the agency's authority.
It is possible that this decision and others like it will be read as
relatively simple applications of Chevron Step One, relying on
the seemingly clear statutory language. However, the court
emphasized that the result would have been the same under
Step Two.Thus, agencies can expect greater difficulty in the
future in attempting to rely on Chevron deference in arguments
about the scope of theirj urisdiction.
Other Decisions of Interest
Several courts found agency action to be arbitrary and
capricious.At the behest of environmental groups, the Second
Circuit in IlatcrkeeperAlliance, Inc. v. USER-, 399 F3d 486 (2 nd
Cir. 2005), struck down EPA regulations governing combined
animal feeding operations (CAFOs).Although EPA prevailed
on several issues, it stumbled over statutory language, inade-
quate explanation of some issues, and a "logical outgrowth"
challenge. InJupiter Energy Corp. v. FERC, 2005 WXL 834473
(5' Cir. 2005), FERC lost an arbitrary and capricious chal-
lenge for the seemingly obvious reason that it characterized a
pipeline as "transportation" and subject to its jurisdiction
when the pipeline was upstream of a "gathering" pipeline not
within FERC's jurisdiction. Finally, the D.C. Circuit struck
down a Surface Transportation Board decision for failure to
continued on next page
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provide a coherent explanation of differential treatment of a
shipper and a carrier in a rate reopening decision. Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company v. Surface Transportation
Board, 403 E3d 771 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
On the Chevron front, a District Court struck down a DOI
interpretation of the Endangered Species Act as unreasonable
under Chevron Step 2. Defenders of /ildife u Secretary of the US.
Dept. of the Interior, 354 FSupp.2d 1156 (D. Oregon 2005). In
Combs u Commissioner of Social Security, 400 F3d 353 (6th Cir.
2005), the court refused to defer to an agency's interpretation of its
statute as authorizing retroactive application of a new regulation.
In Cathedral Candle Company v. United States International Trade
Commission, 400 E3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit
addressed the problem of deference where statutes conflict, and
considered the effects of Auer deference on Chevron deference.
The court also attempted to characterize Skidmore deference in
a way that would render it distinct from Chevron deference, but
more than mere agreement:" MW]e believe the Supreme Court
intends for us to defer to an agency interpretation of the statute
that it administers if the agency has conducted a carefiil analysis
of the statutory issue, if the agency's position has been consis-
tent and reflects agency-wide policy, and if the agency's
position constitutes a reasonable conclusion as to the proper
construction of the statute, even if we might not have adopted
that construction without the benefit of the agency's analysis."
Since this formulation requires a court to accept an agency's
reasonable conclusion, this is a version of"strong deference"
not the weak variety typically associated with Skidmore.
Three other noteworthy decisions are: Legal Environmental
Assistance Foundation, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 400 F3d 1278 (1 th Cir. 2005) (denying standing
in a challenge to the procedural provisions of state permitting
programs under the Clean Air Act); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 398
E3d 722 (6,h Cir. 2005) (striking down an Immigration
Judge's credibility findings, with a useful discussion of the IJ's
responsibilities); and Tunik v. Dethloff, 2005 WL 1110975 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (rejecting the Merit System Protection Board's
repudiation of the concept of"constructive removal" ofALJs
because that concept had been embodied in a regulation after
first having been adopted in an adjudication). C-)
The First Administrative Law Institute conti ued from page 13
allowed the Section to recognize the
important role of the Federal Courts of
Appeals for the D.C. and Federal
Circuits in rulemaking. ChiefJudge
Douglas H. Ginsburg of the D.C.
Circuit and ChiefJudge Paul R. Michel
of the Federal Circuit briefly addressed
remarks to those attending. They were
accompanied by a number of their judi-
cial colleagues on each bench providing
participants a special opportunity to talk
informally with these judges and get to
know them better.
RichardWiley, Managing Partner
Wiley, Rein & Fielding and former
Chair of the Federal Communications
Commission started off day two by
providing an insightful tour of"The 'Ins'
and 'Outs' of Rulemaking: Lessons from
Government and K Street." He was
followed by an expert panel made up of
seasoned practitioners involved in repre-
sentation of interests in rulemaking
proceedings.
The panel included a formerWhite
House Counsel, a former Director of
OMB, and private counsel who
frequently are involved in rulemaking
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matters (both on behalf of private and
public interest groups). Their perspec-
tives on strategy and tactics in preparing
for and influencing rulemaking
proceedings were unparalleled. They
covered such issues as the relative impor-
tance of generating grass roots
comments to the need for detailed,
documented expert reports to establish
the impact of proposed rules.
The Institute's final panel of experts
contained a range of experience across
the federal agency continuum as well as
representatives of special interests
affected by rulemaking. Their presenta-
tions dealt with such key topics as: the
role of special interest groups; Congres-
sional oversight; and the impact of
political priorities at the time, both pres-
idential and congressional; to how to
structure potential interventions.
The vast majority of the participants
at the Institute, some 80 percent, indi-
cated they were government attorneys
obtaining further education on the rule-
making process as it affected their
agency work. Uniformly, their
comments and evaluations showed they
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found this first Institute program of
significant benefit in performing their
work, that it reinforced their theoretical
foundation for rulemaking, and provided
them a better grasp of the process as
practiced government-wide.
Frequently participants in plenary and
breakout sessions noted through their
questions and comments the similarities
of the difficulties they experienced as a
result of the extended time periods that
often are involved in developing detailed
rules. During these periods, the recited
policies may vary because of changes in
agency leadership and difficulties are
encountered simply in handling the
sheer volume of comments received
along with complying with the
complexity of the process, itself.
Overall, this was an auspicious begin-
ning to a new initiative of the Section.
Those primarily responsible for concep-
tualizing and implementing it,Jack
Young and Randy May, deserve great
credit for their efforts as do all of the 33
others who actively participated in
making the Institute the great success it
was, far beyond all expectations. CO)
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1. Many recent articles address the government's legal
response to the war on terrorism.These include
a. The Sleeper Scenario:Terrorism-Support LawsAnd The Demands
Of Prevention, 42 Harv.J. on Legis. 1 (2005).The author
Robert M. Chesney describes, analyzes and critiques post
9/11 Justice Department anti-terrorism challenges and prac-
tices including Padilla, Lackawanna and other litigation.
Focusing on government efforts to stop potential ("sleeper")
terrorists, Chesney argues that the civilian criminal justice
system could effectively address terrorism, vithout unduly
expanding the military's role, if adequate material support
laws were available.The author includes legislative proposals
to remedy the deficiencies of current law.
b. See also, articles in 29 N.Y U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 459,
et. seq. (2005). Included are articles by 1) Federal District
CourtJudge Frederic Block (E.D.N.Y) who in Civil
Liberties During National Emergencies: The Interactions
Betu'een The Three Branches Qf Government In Coping With
PastAnd Current Threats To The X\ation's Security, writes a
concise history of federal anti-terrorism and national
emergency law and practice fromWorldWar I through
last term's Supreme Court decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). [p. 459], and 2) JesselynA. Radack,
who in You Say Defendant, I Say Combatant: Opportunistic
Treatment Of Terrorism Suspects Held In The United States
And The Need For Due Process, critiques the Bush Adminis-
tration's elastic use of the term "enemy combatant"
arguing that it is a tool for "forum-shopping and selective
justice."Also included are critical essays by 1) Burt
Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of War, (p.555), and
2) Kevin Lapp, Pressing Public Necessity: The Unconstitution-
ality Of The AbsconderApprehension Initiative, (p.573).
c. Other recent articles and symposia address the use of imni-
gration powers as tools in the wvar on terrorism.These
include articles by i) Margaret Taylor, who in Dangerous by
Decree: Detention without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50
Loy. L. Rev. 149 (2004) (Forthcoming), describes in detail the
administration's policies for detaining persons without bond,
using various sources of authority including immigration law
and the Patriot Act, ii) Rachel Canty, who in The New' World
of Immigration Custody Determinations after Zadvydas v. Davis,
18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 467 (2004), discusses the effect of post
9/11 developments on the Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678
* Associate Professor ofLa-,TheJohn Marshall Law School, Chicago,
IL;Vice-Chair, Constitutional Law and Separation of Powers Commit-
tee; and Contributing Editor. These abstracts are drawn primarily from
the authors' introductions to their articles.To avoid duplication, the
abstracts do not include articles from the Administrative Law Review
which Administrative Law Section Members already receive.
(2001) rubric for addressing immigration custody deterni-
nations, and iii) John W Guendelsberger, who inJUDICIAL
DEFERENCE TOAGENCY DECISIONS L-
REMIOVAL PROCEEDINGS IN LIGHT OF INS V.7
VENTURA, 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 605 (2004), discusses the
impact of changes m immigration law andjurisdiction on
L\S v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) which limits Circuit Court
review of INS removal proceedings. See also Symposium:
IMMIGRATION LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL LINE
DRAWING POST-SEPTEMBER 11,25 B.C.THIRD WORLD L.J.
1-220 (2005), including articles by Daniel Kanstroom, Nancy
Morawetz, Mary-Rose Papandrea, Teresa A. iiller, David A.
MA/lartin, Stephen H. Legomsky, and Sophie Robin-Olivier.
2. Other articles seek attack next-generation environ-
mental problems. The authors argue that complex
interconnected multifactor environmental problems
require new, flexible solutions which are difficult to
implement within the current regulatory context. The
authors advocate new strategies. Articles include:
a. Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What Science
Can Do to Help, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. (2005) Forth-
coming, by author Carol Rose. Professor Rose describes
the evolution of environmental law from quality controls to
behavioral controls and back to market and other new wa ve
approaches). She argues new challenges require more mature
environmental science is needed to help resolve difficult
predictive and other problems. She suggests better collabora-
tion between scientists and environmentalists
b. Regulation by Adaptive M1lanagement - Is it Possible?, 7 Minn.J.
L. Sci. &Tech.__ (200) Forthcoming, in which authorJ.B.
Ruhl advocates "'adaptive management" strategies for envi-
ronmental regulation in which the agency adjusts regulatory
solutions based upon new information, and new circum-
stances.The author argues substantial changes in
administrative law may be required to implement the adap-
tive model.
c. A Transaction Cost EcononizingApproach To Regulation: Under-
standing The NXLIBY Problem And Improving Regulatory
Responses, 22YaleJ. on Reg. (2005), in which authors
Barak D. Richman and Christopher Boerner -ish to
attack the NIMBY problem, in xw hich self-interested neigh-
bors block publicly beneficial, but locally troublesome
facilities, such as solid waste incinerators, resisting efforts by
developers to negotiate compensation for such local harms.
The authors argue that viexving NIMBY disputes as a
contracting problem leads to insights which may help to
address the problem.The authors employ the theory of the
firm, specifically transaction cost economics, to articulate the
continued on next page
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functional purpose of environmental siting regulations and to
chart an agenda for regulatory reform.
d. Mustering The Missing oices:A Collaborative Model For
Fostering Equality, Community Involvement And Adaptive
Planning In Land Use Decisions, 24 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3
(2005), in which author Alejandro Esteban Camacho
wants to replace bilateral negotiated local land use plan-
ning between localities and developers with a
collaborative decision making model which includes
broader participation by all affected interests. (Part 2 of
this article will be in the journal's next issue.)
3. Still other articles address various aspects ofjudicial
review. These include:
a. Hou, MEAD Has Muddled Judicial Reviue ofAgency Action,
59Vand. L. Rev. __ (2005), Forthcoming, in which author
Lisa Schultz Bressman advises how to clarify the post-
Mead doctrinal "muddle" regarding the applicability of
Chevron deference. The author surveys the lower courts'
inconsistency and chaos in applying Mead, and evaluates
the prescience of Scalia's dissent. Author Bressman advo-
cates a third approach to best reconcile Mead (and
Barnhart).This approach provides Congress and agencies
flexibility to design and invoke informal procedures to
retain Chevron eligibility, provided the procedures are
transparent, rational and binding.
b. Rulemaking Versus Adjudication :A Psychological Perspective, 32
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. - (2005), in which author Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski uses cognitive theory to argue for stronger
judicial review of the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication.The author contends that because the form
of decision making can have a significant effect on the
outcome, greater judicial scrutiny of the
rulemaking/adjudication choice is warranted.
c. Providing Judicial Review For Decisions By Political Trustees, 15
DukeJ. Comp. & Int'l L. 1 (2004) in which author Henry
H. Perritt, Jr. analogizes from administrative law to
argue for judicial review of decisions by "political trustees"
i.e., people who manage countries in reconstruction
which are under international supervision.
d. Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 4)1 (2005), in
which author Gary D. Rowe uses ChiefJustice John
Marshall's UNITED STATES V. PETERS, 9 U.S. (5 CRANCH) 115
(1809), the first United States Supreme Court case to strike
down a state law, to examine and reconstruct the origins and
extent of the original support forjudicial review.The author
states the case led to an armed clash between federal and state
forces in the streets of Philadelphia after Pennsylvania refused
to comply with the Supreme Court's enforcement order.
e. Who's so Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment, 105 Colum. L.
Rev. (2005), Forthcoming, in which Jesse H. Choper
and John C.Yoo argue that the Rehnquist Court's
expansive 1 1h amendment analysis, while doctrinally
messy, is of little practical significance given the many
alternative means of enforcing state compliance with
federal regulation.
f. Allocating Power Over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 907 (2004), Forthcoming, in which author
Arti K. Rai evaluates separate and somewhat divergent
advisory reports by two agencies, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) and the National Academy for Science (NAS) on
the scope of the Federal Circuit's review of the United States
Patent andTrade Office's (USPTO's) heavily policy-depend-
ent fact finding regarding the patentability of an invention.
Both reports recommend altering the standard of review, but
somewhat diverge on the proper standard. Author Rai
marginally sides with the FTC.
4. Daryl J. Levinson's Empire-Building Government in
Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915 (2005), Christo-
pher S. Elmendorf's, Representation Reinforcement through
Advisory Commissions:The Case of Election Law,
Forthcoming, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. - (2005) and Rachel E.
Barkow's, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715
(2005) assess the efficacy of various government institu-
tional structures.
a. In Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, author
Levinson critiques conventional federalism, separation of
powers, and other structural models as improperly character-
izing govermnents as greed-driven, imperialistic, self-
aggrandizing behemoths pitted against each other in a peren-
nial battle to maximize institutional wealth and power.
Instead, the author argues, better predictions of government
behavior would arise from constitutional models which root
government behavior in a combination of constituent driven
political pressures, and independent interests the officials may
wish to, and politically can, pursue.The author argues that
democratic governments are unlikely to produce officials
who are more concerned with institutional, rather than
political, power.
b. In Representation Reiforcenent through Advisory Commissions:
77e Case of Election Law author Elmendoif advocates limit-
ing incumbents' power to enact legislative policies (such as
election laws) which entrench their position against
outsiders.The author proposes a standing advisory commit-
tee as a possible model for doing so.
c. In Administering Crime, author Barkow, seeking to remedy
the dearth of scholarship assessing the institutional design
of sentencing commissions, parole boards, corrections
departments and other administrative agencies critically
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responsible for the administration of criminal law, evalu-
ates the efficacy of various models for sentencing
commissions. Drawing on administrative law, political
science, and the actual experience of federal and state
sentencing commissions, the author argues that, contrary
to popular wisdom, politically enmeshed sentencing
agency models are more efficacious than politically insu-
lated ones, if the structural design objective is to minimize
political impulses by maximizing the agency's influence
over sentencing policy.
d. For a historical perspective, see Christopher S.Yoo, Steven
G. Calabresi and Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Execu-
tive in the Mlodeni Era, 1945-2004,90 Iowa L. Rev. 601
(2005).This article is the last in a four part series of articles
that have amassed an historical record of the practice of
Presidential control of administration from the country's
founding through the modern era.
5. A collection of critical pieces critique 1) the
rational actor model of the human being, 2) the
market protection model of corporate regulation, 3)
the proportionality model of diversity, 4) federal
Indian administrative law policy, and 5) the failure of
the United States to give significant housing support
to veterans.
a. In The Situational Character:A Critical Realist Perspective On
The Human Animal, 93 Geo. L.J. 1 (2004), authors Jon
Hanson and DavidYosifon thoroughly (822 footnotes)
analyze a wide range of recent social science and other
scholarship to argue comprehensively that legal theory
must reject the "rational actor" model of the human being,
in favor of a "situational" actor whose decision making is
unconsciously or subconsciously affected by external
matters which he or she does not fully understand.
b. In The Illusion Qf Law: The Legitimating Schemas Qf Modern
PolicyAnd Corporate Lan', 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2004),
authors Ronald Chen andJon Hanson provide an in-
depth critical retrospective on the political and rhetorical
development and entrenchment of the current "free hand
of the market" predominant policymaking model.
c. In Second-Order Diversity, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1099 (2005),
author Heather K. Gerken argues for a different concept
of diversity beyond "proportional representation." Instead,
she argues for an institutional model of diversity in which
minority groups can control some institutions, thus
permitting the groups to have a stronger voice, and to
more effectively exercise, political power.
d. In The Insidious Colonialism of the Conqueror: The Federal
Government in Modern TribalAffairs, 19 Wash. U.J. L & Pol.
-(2005), Forthcoming, author Matthew L.M. Fletcher
argues that federal Indian administrative law policy under-
mines Native Americans' right to self-determination.
e. In National Ingratitude:The Egregious Deficiencies Of The
United States' Housing Programs For Veterans And The "Public
Scandal" Qf Veterans' Homelessness, 38 Ind. L. Rev. 103
(2005), author Florence Wagman Roisman discusses
the United State's failure to provide adequate housing
support for veterans.
6. Richard L. Kaplan's The Security of Social Security
Benefits and the President's Proposal, 16 Elder L. Rep. 1
(April, 2005) lucidly summarizes and analyzes 1) current
Social Security funding and 2) President GeorgeW Bush's
proposed Social Security plan.
7.James P. Nehf's Incomparability And The Passive
Virtues OfAd Hoc Privacy Policy, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1
(2005). Critiques Congress' minimalist approach to regu-
lation of information privacy outside of government. The
author blames dissonant analytical privacy models in
which traditional, limited, cost-benefit arguments which
weigh the benefits of the free flow of information against
the costs of privacy protection, run up against the rhetori-
cal fundamental rights centered arguments favored by
privacy advocates.
8. Finally, two articles gamely undertake daunting
interpretive challenges.
a. In A Textualist Defense ofArticle I, Section 7, Clause 3: Vhy
Hollingsworth v. Virginia was Rightly Decided, and 1171), 'S v
Chadha was IT'rongly Reasoned, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1265 (2005),
author Seth Barrett Tillman undertakes to rigorously
prove that the Bicameralism and Presentment clause
requires Presentment only, if such an option is legislativel
authorized by Congress. In response, author Garv Lawson
concludes that Tillman is correct, but only with regard to
legislative subpoenas. See Gary Lawson, Burning Dou'n the
House (and Senate):A Presentment Requirement for Legislative
Subpoenas Uinder the Orders, Resolutions, and I btes Clase, 83
TEXAS L. REV __ (2005) Forthcoming. In reply,
Tillman disagrees with Lawson's reply and says why. See,
The Domain of Constitutional Delegations Under the Orders,
Resolutions, and V'tcs Clause, 83 Tex. L. Rev. ___ (2005)
(Forthcoming.)
b. In Discretion as Delegation: The "Proper" Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 Geo.Wash. L. Rev. 235 (2005),
Author Gary Lawson undertakes his own daunting
interpretive challenge, by explicitly seeking to rigorously
prove that the non-delegation doctrine is properly rooted
in the Constitution. No response yet from Eric Posner
and AdrienVermuele. C-.
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Oregon Annuls Same Sex Marriages: State Statute
Controls, Not County Interpretation of Constitution
By William Funk*
In Li v. State, -P3d-,- Or.-, 2005WL 852319
(April 14, 2005), same sex marriage met administrative law.
The Oregon Supreme Court in 1986 had rendered a decision
in which it held that governmental officials have "a duty to
follow the Constitution regardless of whether a court has ruled
on the constitutionality of a particular issue." Cooper v. Eugene
School Dist. No. 4, 301 Or. 358,364- 65,723 P2d 298 (1986).
In a thoughtful opinion by then Justice Hans Linde, the Court
explained that: "Long familiarity with the institution ofjudicial
review sometimes leads to the misconception that constitu-
tional law is exclusively a matter for the courts.To the contrary,
when a court sets aside government action on constitutional
grounds, it necessarily holds that legislators or officials attentive
to a proper understanding of the constitution would or should
have acted differently."
In early 2004, the county attorney for Multnomah county
rendered an opinion to the county council that, while Oregon
law required couples wishing to marry to be of opposite sexes,
to deny marriage licenses to same sex couples would violate the
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so have varied from the terms of the compact under review to
the prevailing standard of review prior to adoption of the federal
APA to considerations of the subject matter of the dispute.
Project co-chairJeffrey B. Litwak, counsel to the Columbia
River Gorge Commission and adjunct professor of law at Lewis
and Clark Law School, discussed availability of review, which
can be complicated by questions of who the proper respondent
is - normally the agency applying the compact but in some
cases a signatory state. Litwak said that in some cases provision
for review is to be found in congressional consent legislation or
may be inferred from state general jurisdiction statutes. He
opined that in a case where a court must decide which state has
venue, the court may look to general principles resolving
conflicts-of-laws or the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Shaun Gehan of Collier Shannon Scott, and a former repre-
sentative on the Interstate Commission for the Potomac River
Basin, used the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact
(ASMFC) to illustrate the problems, some unique to that
compact, that practitioners face when a compact is silent on
availability of review. Under the ASMFC, the function of the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission is to issue recom-
mended fishery management rules for voluntary adoption by
the signatory states, but no provision is made for judicial review.
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Oregon state constitution. Accordingly, under the duty seem-
ingly required in Cooper, the county directed its marriage
license office to issue licenses to same sex couples, and as a
result approximately 3000 same sex marriages were performed
before November 2004, when the voters by initiative amended
the Oregon Constitution to require that marriages can onily be
between one man and one woman.
The question in Li was the validity of those marriages.
Initially, the Court decided that the amendment to the Consti-
tution was only prospective and did not by its terms purport to
eliminate existing marriages. Rather than review the decision
of the county that the state Constitution before its amendment
prohibited discrimination against same sex couples wishing to
marry, the Court held that whatever the state Constitution
provided, the county was required to follow Oregon statutory
law. The Court limited Cooper by interpreting it to apply only
in situations where the issue arises before a state official in an
administrative adjudication - as indeed was the case in Cooper.
Thus, only where an agency is acting in a quasi-judicial manner
can it interpret and apply the Constitution in a manner incon-
sistent with statute. C>
* Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA Law School; Council Member;
Advisory Board Chair; and Contributing Editor.
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A later-enacted statute mandates the promulgation and adop-
tion of such rules and authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to
declare a fishing moratorium in the waters of any non-comply-
ing state. Direct review of such rules would only be available
under an implied right of action theory. More likely, challengers
must wait for the Secretary to hold enforcement hearings -
well after the rules have been promulgated - before challenging
them in court.
The Future of Europe and Government Technology
Philip Lader reminisced at the Saturday dinner about his
experiences in London while serving as Ambassador to Great
Britain in the Clinton Administration. He also previewed the
then upcoming British elections for Prime Minister and French
vote on the European Constitution. He urged the Section to
follow through with its EU project. Breakfast with Bill Eggers
the following morning highlighted the potential for technology
to transform government in the 21st Century. (See the review of
Eggers' book on this topic elsewhere in this issue).
All in all, a memorable meeting and one for the Section to
build on. C>
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